Shyam's Slide Share Presentations

VIRTUAL LIBRARY "KNOWLEDGE - KORRIDOR"

This article/post is from a third party website. The views expressed are that of the author. We at Capacity Building & Development may not necessarily subscribe to it completely. The relevance & applicability of the content is limited to certain geographic zones.It is not universal.

TO VIEW MORE CONTENT ON THIS SUBJECT AND OTHER TOPICS, Please visit KNOWLEDGE-KORRIDOR our Virtual Library

Showing posts with label business. Show all posts
Showing posts with label business. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 5, 2017

50 Smartest companies as per MIT Evaluation 07-06




View the List

It Pays to Be Smart

Superstar companies are dominating the economy by exploiting a growing gap in digital competencies. 

Our economy is increasingly ruled by a few dominant firms. We see them everywhere, from established giants Amazon, Facebook, Google, Apple, and Walmart to fast-growing newcomers like Airbnb, Tesla, and Uber. There have always been large companies and outright monopolies, but there’s something distinctive about this new generation of what some economists call superstar companies. They appear across a broad range of business sectors and have gained their power at least in part by adeptly anticipating and using digital technologies that foster conditions where a few winners essentially take all.

Our annual list of the 50 Smartest Companies includes many of these firms, but it’s not merely a list of today’s biggest or most profitable players. It highlights technologically innovative companies whose business models allow them to exploit these advances. The list is our best guess as to which firms will be the dominant companies of the future. Amazon and Facebook and Google are on it, but so are plenty of newcomers. Though they might be unfamiliar to you today, we believe they have an inside track to take advantage of the technologies, such as artificial intelligence, that will define business in the coming years. Being smart about innovation won’t guarantee that these firms become superstars. But it does, at least, give them the potential to create and dominate new markets in an increasingly competitive business environment. 

The emergence of superstar companies has, in many ways, helped to define our era. Digital giants, in particular, have cleverly leveraged the Internet, so-called network effects, and big data to become hugely profitable while providing indispensable serviceslike free Web search and easy online shoppingand devices that have changed our lives (see “Why Tesla Is Worth More Than GM”).

But Internet companies aren’t the only ones to become superstars. According to recent research by economists at Harvard and MIT, the share of sales by superstar companieswhich the authors define as the four largest firms in a given industryhas gone up sharply in all the sectors they looked at, from transportation to services to finance. The trend toward  superstar firms is accelerating, says Lawrence Katz, a Harvard economist and coauthor of the study. It has become more uniform across industries and developed economies during the past decade or so. These companies’ dominance is particularly strong in markets undergoing rapid technological change. Katz says that’s probably because of the wide disparity in how well companies take advantage of new advances. In other words, you have to be the smartest company in your field or you might as well not bother.

In itself, that might not be bad. But the authors identified a deeply troubling result of an economy where just a few top-tier companies dominate. One of the economic truths of much of the 20th century was that the portion of the country’s overall income that went to labor was constant; as the economy grew, workers got a proportionate share of that growing pie. But labor’s share of the national income has been shrinking over the past few decades. This is true in many countries, and the decline speeded up in the United States in the 2000s.

The trend puzzles economists. Some suggest it reflects the rise of cheap robots that can do the jobs of human workers, but the data isn’t convincing. Instead, Katz and his coauthors blame the emergence of the superstar companies. As these companies grow and become more efficient and more adept at using digital technologies, they need fewer workers relative to their soaring revenues. The fact that these labor-frugal firms have so much of the market share in their sectors means labor gets a smaller portion of the nation’s overall income.

Compounding the problem is that superstar companies, which desire the best possible talent, tend to pay much better than anyone else. This dynamic is deepening the divide between the country’s economic winners and losers. Nicholas Bloom, an economist at Stanford, and his colleagues have shown that about one-third of the growth in U.S. income inequality since 1980 can be explained by the disparity between the pay premiums of a few elite companies and the salaries most workers earn. Fewer and fewer peoplemostly a select group of highly trained professionalsare enjoying the vast profits generated by these top companies. It is “certainly a big part of the [economic] anxiety” that is plaguing the country, Katz believes.

The rise of the superstar companies also might help explain another disturbing economic trend. Despite the proliferation of impressive new advances in software, digital devices, and artificial intelligence over the last decade and the great profits generated by Silicon Valley, economic growth in the United States and other developed countries has been sluggish (see “Dear Silicon Valley: Forget Flying Cars, Give Us Economic Growth”). In particular, an economic measure called total factor productivity, which is meant to reflect innovation, has been dismal (see “Tech Slowdown Threatens the American Dream”).



How can overall growth be so lackluster while the high-tech sector is booming?


Economists with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development think they have found the answer. It turns out that productivity at the top companies in various sectors—what the OECD economists call the frontier firms—is growing robustly. These are the companies making the best use of the Internet, software, and other technologies to streamline their operations and create new market opportunities. But most companies aren’t actually harnessing new technologies very effectively. And the relatively poor productivity of these laggards, says OECD economist Dan Andrews, is dragging down the overall economy. “Technologies are increasingly complex, and many firms may lack the competencies to adapt,” suggests Andrews, coauthor of the OECD study, which looked at the United States and 23 other developed countries.

In some ways the OECD findings are encouraging, because they demonstrate that recent innovations do—in the hands of top companies—have the potential to strongly improve productivity. But surprisingly, says Andrews, the laggards seem to be making little progress toward catching up; new ideas and business practices aren’t trickling down as rapidly as they should. The reason isn’t entirely clear, he says. But it seems that the economy is less dynamic and efficient at “dispersing” new technologies than we might think.

Such findings help drive home the importance of the 50 Smartest Companies list. Be assured, there are no laggards on it. But the research by Andrews and others also shows why we need a better business climateone that allows more startups and fresh ideas to thrive. Today’s giant companies are pulling ahead, and a dwindling number of individuals are reaping the financial rewards. There is nothing inevitable about that trend. The advent of complex technologies such as artificial intelligence, which will be critical to future business success and are tricky to understand and master, could widen the gap further. They could also provide ample opportunities for new companies to create markets that don’t even exist today. We do need companies to aggressively push the frontiers of innovation. Still, as we celebrate our 50 Smartest Companies, it is worth keeping in mind the importance of distributing know-how, and the wealth it produces, more broadly.


View the List 

Reproduced from MIT Technology Review

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Managing Tensions Between New and Existing Business Models05-25


The search for new business models forces established companies to experiment with organizational designs — and leads to tensions that should be anticipated and carefully managed.






Image credit : Shyam's Imagination Library
.............................................................................................................................................................
Exploring new business models is a recognized way for mature companies to renew their competitive advantage. Companies explore new value propositions, deploy value propositions in new segments, change the value chain, or experiment with alternative revenue models — all in a search for a different logic for value creation and capture. Sometimes this exploration goes far beyond the existing business model and requires the creation of a new business unit.

A sometimes unexpected consequence is the difficulty of fitting this new business unit into the existing organizational structure. While business model experimentation may be the raison d’être of many startup ventures, established companies typically face strong organizational rigidities that lead to tensions. Predicting these tensions and being open to experimentation with organizational structure can be the keys to a smoother business model exploration process. In this article, we report on a study of the European postal industry, in which we examined the organizational challenges that affect incumbent organizations in mature industries as they react to disruptive changes in their environment by seeking new business models.

Although the Romans had a type of postal service, the European postal industry as we know it today has existed for the past 500 years or so — one of the oldest, in Portugal, traces its history to 1520. For close to two centuries, established operators have been using essentially the same business model, pioneered in 1837 in the United Kingdom. In that model, senders pay a postal operator (usually through the purchase of a stamp) to bring a piece of mail or a parcel from A to B, with pricing dependent on some combination of distance, size, and weight. However, the postal industry has recently faced a rapid decline in physical mail as a result of digital substitution, while regulatory liberalization has boosted the level of competition in postal markets. Many postal operators have reacted by exploring new opportunities in the digital marketplace.

By interviewing managers and reviewing relevant information, we studied Danish, Portuguese, and Swiss postal operators to find out how they have dealt with the challenge of exploring new business models since the turn of the millennium. The organizations we studied strived to maintain their core business while at the same time incubating new ventures. Managers at all of the organizations felt there were potential new business models that they could benefit from developing, but when exploring the building blocks of these business models, they found that tensions emerged in their organizations. It required a separate process of organizational experimentation to find out how to organize for business model exploration.

Managing the Tensions

Our research points to three key areas of tension almost any existing business will face if it attempts to discover entirely new business models. Whether management succeeds in handling those tensions will determine their success in identifying and implementing new business models.

1. Don’t settle too quickly on structure. Top management is typically trained to see organizational structure as a means of executing strategy. As the business historian Alfred D. Chandler put it, “structure follows strategy.” In the case of business model exploration, however, our research suggests it’s a mistake for management to settle too quickly on a strategy and structure for the new business. In 2006, the Danish postal service, Post Danmark A/S, acquired Strålfors, an information logistics company, and subsequently positioned some of the company’s other innovative ventures within this subsidiary. It was thought there were possible synergies in merging products, but the fit was less than perfect, and as one manager put it, ultimately the business units “moved a bit around over the years.” The Danish and Swedish posts subsequently merged to form a new company, now called PostNord AB. PostNord at one point signaled to the market that Strålfors was for sale but then, in the fall of 2015, announced that it would retain ownership of Strålfors, after all. A manager from another postal operator offered a similar account of the struggle with how to fit a new venture into an old company, pointing out how that operator had to “constantly learn and modify … how we organize ourselves.”

The lesson for any organization wanting to explore new business models is to not settle too quickly on a structure for the new business. In fact, the organizational structure can more usefully be thought of as one of the essential building blocks of the business model — that is, as an aspect of the new business that needs to be fully explored and experimented with before you can learn what works best.
2. Balance top management support and experimentation. Exploring new business models is a strategic decision aimed at adapting the company’s activities to an evolving business landscape and discovering new revenue streams. At the postal operators we studied, this involved numerous initiatives. For example, the Swiss Post decided there might be an opportunity to expand its partnerships with online retail businesses beyond picking up and delivering parcels. The Swiss Post could leverage its established, trusted brand by selling secure sockets layer (SSL) certificates, digital signature solutions, and email certificates to online retailers and other businesses. However, setting up the new business unit involved the creation of new capabilities, both on the IT and the sales sides. It was recognized that this new business unit would be very different from the organization’s existing core business. The solution involved acquiring a startup that had developed some core solutions in this space and then building the business with a mix of management and staff hired from outside as well as transferred from the core business.

Management clearly identified a need to protect the fledgling business from above. The new business unit was a strategic initiative and as such needed to be shepherded by top management. As one manager told us, “We really managed to make sure that from the top … these organizations were protected. You need to have ownership by the CEO; otherwise, this is destroyed extremely quickly.” However, it was also gradually recognized that top management should not try to steer the new business unit. As one manager said, “It is clearly an advantage if people [in the new business unit] are a little bit remote of the headquarters. The headquarters has an existing way of doing business … you develop much more successfully if you give these people space and distance to the core.” This implies a balancing act for top management between protecting and coaching, on the one hand, and leaving the new business unit to experiment, on the other.

3. Expect a power struggle for resources. Any new business model has to grow and coexist with existing business models that may be stagnating but still provide the lion’s share of revenues for the company. Managers of such existing business models can be powerful and may have turf to protect in the internal struggle for resources. They and their employees may feel threatened if the new business unit becomes too successful. Furthermore, the new business model may not be profitable for a long time, leading to the risk that needed investments are diverted from more profitable parts of the business. One manager told us that this “has perhaps been the biggest barrier — that we are competing and working to get access to the same IT resources within the company.”

Top management needs to manage this potential competition for resources between the new business and the old core business. One way to achieve this is to accept multiple business logics, as well as multiple performance management and measurement systems. As one manager explained, “We quite successfully managed to convince the internal management that, for the moment, revenue streams shall not be the most important performance indicator.” Alternative metrics could include the estimated market potential, for example.

A point to consider is the importance of communicating across the company why it is engaging in business model exploration and how this will benefit the company in the long term. Conflicts for scarce resources within the organization cannot be avoided completely, but they can be softened if employees across business units build a shared understanding of the objectives of the business model exploration.

The Organizational Dimension

The business model canvas framework developed by Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur has become a very popular way to understand the potential building blocks of business models. The canvas highlights nine such building blocks: customer segments, value propositions, channels, customer relationships, revenue streams, key resources, key activities, key partnerships, and cost structure. However, organizational designs and the associated organizational tensions that emerge during the process of business model exploration are not well addressed by the existing tools. Companies exploring new business models may not fully recognize that these tensions will almost inevitably emerge and thus may be ill-prepared to manage them.

Understanding these tensions should help in managing the challenges of concurrent business models.
The tensions we highlight imply that the design of an organizational structure that accommodates both new and older business models needs to be considered an intricate part of business model innovation. Organizational design has to be questioned and experimented with as part of the exploration. A top management team that is prepared for such exploration and aware of the organizational dimension of business model exploration may well be more likely to succeed at business model innovation.


Monday, May 26, 2014

Guide to Getting Your Customer Churn Rate in the Zone 05-26

Guide to Getting Your Customer Churn Rate in the Zone


Whatever you call it – defection, attrition, turnover – customer churn is a painful reality that all businesses have to deal with. Even the largest and most successful companies suffer from customer churn, and understanding what causes formerly loyal customers to abandon ship is crucial to lasting, sustainable business growth.

In today’s post, we’re going to look at what customer churn is, what constitutes a “good” churn rate, and ways you can stop your customers turning their backs on you forever.
Art installation by Tim Etchells

What Is Customer Churn?

Client churn is when existing customers stop doing business with you. This can mean different things depending on the nature of your business. Examples include:
  • Cancelation of a subscription
  • Closure of an account
  • Non-renewal of a contract or service agreement
  • Consumer decision to shop at another store/use another service provider
Before you can figure out what your churn rate is, you need to decide how you’re going to quantify actions such as those above and agree on what defines customer attrition for your business. Once you’ve done this, you can hit the books and do the math.

Calculating Customer Churn


You can measure client churn in one or more of the following ways:
  • Total number of customers lost during a specific period
  • Percentage of customers lost during a specific period
  • Recurring business value lost
  • Percentage of recurring value lost
Let’s look at this example from Churn-Rate.com, in which your company has 100 subscribers at the beginning of the month:



You could also choose to calculate your churn rate based on how many subscribers you had at the end of the month, rather than the beginning:


You can also calculate customer churn based on revenue. Businesses that take this approach typically use monthly reoccurring revenue (MRR) as a baseline figure. Now bear with me, because the math gets a little more complicated when calculating client churn using MRR.

In the following example, a company had $500,000 of MRR at the beginning of the month, and $450,000 at the end. Now, let’s say that the company brought in $65,000 from existing customers who purchased upgrades that same month. The churn calculation looks like this:


As you can see, the churn rate is negative – meaning that the company actually ended up making money despite the $50,000 loss in MRR. This is known as negative churn.

However you choose to calculate it, customer churn hurts – a lot. So grab your Kleenex, wipe away those tears, and let’s look at “good” churn rates and how you can lower yours.

What Is A ‘Good’ Customer Churn Rate?

In an ideal world (one in which customers never complained, cats and dogs lived together in peace and harmony, and nobody ever posted “Game of Thrones” spoilers on Facebook), the perfect client churn rate would be zero.

Unfortunately, this is not going to happen. No matter how excellent your service is or great your products are, you will lose customers. This doesn’t mean you can’t achieve and maintain a “good” churn rate – or, at least, one that’s acceptable. But what is a good churn rate, anyway? Well, that depends on your industry.

Some sectors have significantly higher rates of customer attrition than others. However, it’s difficult pinning down average customer churn rates by industry because, for some reason, most companies aren’t too keen to broadcast how many customers they lose on a regular basis. Weird.

Image © Bethesda Softworks
However, there is some data out there that can give you a better idea of what you can expect in certain sectors:
  • American credit card companies typically have customer churn rates of around 20%
  • European cellular carriers experience churn of between 20-38%
  • Certain American telcos, such as Verizon, have reported very low churn rates – like 0.84% in Q2 2012
  • Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) companies usually report client churn rates of between 5-7%
  • Many retail banks have churn rates of between 20-25%
  • In 2003, the churn rate of daily newspaper subscriptions in the U.S. was 58%
Customer churn rates that could be considered fantastic for one business might be atrocious for another. Why? Because not all business models are the same, and even companies with similar business models might define churn differently.
Let’s say your business operates on a subscription model. How long are your subscription contracts? How much does the lifetime value of a typical customer change in relation to the length of their contract? How long does it take to recoup the initial costs of customer acquisition and for the account to become profitable? On average, how many new customers do you attract per month? These are all questions that will affect what client churn rate you should be aiming for.

Ways To Reduce Customer Churn

So, now that you’ve got a rough idea of a churn rate that’s acceptable for your business, how do you reduce client churn? By going the extra mile, right from the start.

Make a Great First Impression

Customers are less likely to look around for something better if you blow them away from the very first moment they encounter your business.
Josh Ledgard, co-founder of KickoffLabs, says that the first five minutes with a new customer are paramount. If someone sees immediate results when using a product or service for the first time, they’re significantly less likely to look for opportunities to churn because they believe that they could be even more successful as time goes on.
The better a customer’s first experience, the stronger their commitment and buy-in will be – and the chances of them churning further down the road will be lower.

Consistently Exceed Customers’ Expectations

Failing to deliver on a promise is one of the fastest ways to lose a customer, and many companies say that dissatisfaction and unmet expectations are among the top reasons for client churn. It’s not enough for you to just make a great first impression – you also have to consistently meet your customers’ expectations and exceed them whenever possible.
You could be forgiven for thinking that you start meeting and exceeding your customers’ expectations when they’re already a full-fledged user of your products or service, but the process begins much earlier than that – specifically, with your sales team during the very first call. Don’t let reps who are trying to meet their monthly quota oversell your business or make promises you can’t keep, or you’ll find it very difficult (or impossible) to meet your customers’ expectations, never mind exceed them.
Be honest about what your customers can expect, and consistently deliver what you promise.

Provide Awesome Customer Service

This one should go without saying, but if you’ve ever spent half an hour listening to hold muzak waiting for a disinterested, incompetent customer service rep to “assist you,” you’ll know that some companies simply don’t put enough effort into customer service.
Image © Scott Adams
recent survey by Zendesk revealed precisely what drives people crazy about customer service. Some key takeaways:
  • 42% of respondents said repeating their problem to multiple reps was the most frustrating aspect of dealing with customer service departments
  • 35% of consumers stop doing business with a company altogether after a single negative customer service experience
  • 16% of irate customers will vent their frustrations on social media sites following a negative interaction (a figure that seems very low to me) – but only 8% will do the same to praise good customer service
  • 60% of consumers are strongly influenced by comments about companies on social media sites
Something else to consider is being proactive, rather than reactive, when it comes to customer service. Don’t wait for customers to come after you with burning torches and pitchforks; make sure you have an outreach initiative in place to check in with customers long before problems arise.
Remember – it’s much cheaper to retain an existing customer than it is to acquire a new one.

Listen Carefully to What Your Customers Tell You

Some business owners think that nobody knows their business better than they do, but they’re wrong – their customers do. Listening carefully to feedback from customers is one of the best ways to identify those who may be at risk of jumping ship.

For example, if a customer threatens to close their account because your service costs too much, they might actually mean that they haven’t had time to fully explore the product, resulting in a misconception about its true value. Then again, it could mean that you really are charging too much.

Whatever your customers tell you, try to really listen to what they’re saying. Think about how sales professionals overcome prospects’ objections – many people throw up “smokescreen” objections that may not necessarily be legitimate concerns, simply because they dislike being “sold to.” Be ready to help make your customers’ lives easier with real solutions based on what they’re actually saying, not what you think they’re saying. Of course, in some cases, you’ll have little choice but to…

Let Some Customers Churn

This is another concept that some business owners find difficult to wrap their head around, but sometimes, you just have to let customers go.
This doesn’t mean you should ignore client churn rates, be content to provide poor service, or adopt a revolving-door policy when it comes to customer acquisition. 

It does mean, however, that you should know when to give up and let a customer walk. How do you know when it’s time to break up with a customer? By looking at the situation with profitability in mind.

Let’s say you identify a group of customers who are at risk of turning to a competitor. You immediately reach out to them and offer a generous incentive to stay, right? Wrong. First, you should figure out if the at-risk customers are even worth saving.

This concept is utterly alien to many businesses, because they mistakenly assume that all customers are equally valuable. Sure, this may be the case for some companies, but most businesses have a core group of customers who spend more, evangelize about their products on social media, and stay with the business longer. 

However, even the most loyal customer can still defect to another company if they feel their needs are not being met or that they’re being taken for granted. This is why these are the customers who are worth spending time and money to retain.

Sunil Gupta, a professor of business administration at Harvard Business School, says that in addition to determining customers’ churn probability, businesses should also calculate:
  • How much they spend
  • The likelihood that they will respond positively to a retention incentive offer
  • How much this offer will cost the business in terms of overhead or lost revenue
According to Gupta, businesses should only reach out to at-risk customers once they have all this information. Don’t settle for merely reducing client churn rates – focus on reducing churn andmaximizing profits. You can read more about how to do this in “Managing Churn to Maximize Profits,” a research paper that Gupta co-authored with Aurélie Lemmens of the Tilburg School of Economics and Management.

Identify Why Customers Cancel, Then Fix It

Remember all that math we did earlier to calculate churn rates? Well, although you need to know what your churn rate is, you also need to know why customers stop doing business with you.

A lot of businesses fail at this because it involves asking some uncomfortable questions and admitting that they’re not actually awesome at everything after all. However, identifying the most common causes of abandonment – and acting on them to improve things – can be a great way to reduce customer churn rates.


Make sure you give customers plenty of opportunities to tell you why they’re leaving. This could be a (brief) survey, a multiple-choice question, a comment field in a “We’ll miss you!” email – anything. Just make sure you can figure out why you’re losing customers, then take steps to tackle the most frequent reasons people are abandoning you.

Well, that just about wraps it up for today’s post. Hopefully you can apply some of these tips to your business. Unless you have a churn rate of zero, of course, in which case power to you (your pants appear to be on fire).


Wednesday, May 14, 2014

How to Design a Winning Business Model 05-15

How to Design a Winning Business Model


Artwork: Damián Ortega, Controller of the Universe, 2007, found tools and wire, 285 x 405 x 455 cm
Strategy has been the primary building block of competitiveness over the past three decades, but in the future, the quest for sustainable advantage may well begin with the business model. While the convergence of information and communication technologies in the 1990s resulted in a short-lived fascination with business models, forces such as deregulation, technological change, globalization, and sustainability have rekindled interest in the concept today. Since 2006, the IBM Institute for Business Value’s biannual Global CEO Study has reported that senior executives across industries regard developing innovative business models as a major priority. 
A 2009 follow-up study reveals that seven out of 10 companies are engaging in business-model innovation, and an incredible 98% are modifying their business models to some extent. Business model innovation is undoubtedly here to stay.
That isn’t surprising. The pressure to crack open markets in developing countries, particularly those at the middle and bottom of the pyramid, is driving a surge in business-model innovation. The economic slowdown in the developed world is forcing companies to modify their business models or create new ones. In addition, the rise of new technology-based and low-cost rivals is threatening incumbents, reshaping industries, and redistributing profits. Indeed, the ways by which companies create and capture value through their business models is undergoing a radical transformation worldwide.
Yet most enterprises haven’t fully come to grips with how to compete through business models. Our studies over the past seven years show that much of the problem lies in companies’ unwavering focus on creating innovative models and evaluating their efficacy in isolation—just as engineers test new technologies or products. However, the success or failure of a company’s business model depends largely on how it interacts with models of other players in the industry. (Almost any business model will perform brilliantly if a company is lucky enough to be the only one in a market.) Because companies build them without thinking about the competition, they routinely deploy doomed business models

Our research also shows that when enterprises compete using business models that differ from one another, the outcomes are difficult to predict. One business model may appear superior to others when analyzed in isolation but create less value than the others when interactions are considered. Or rivals may end up becoming partners in value creation. Appraising models in a stand-alone fashion leads to faulty assessments of their strengths and weaknesses and bad decision making. This is a big reason why so many new business models fail.
Moreover, the propensity to ignore the dynamic elements of business models results in many companies failing to use them to their full potential. Few executives realize that they can design business models to generate winner-take-all effects that resemble the network externalities that high-tech companies such as Microsoft, eBay, and Facebook have created. 
Whereas network effects are an exogenous feature of technologies, winner-take-all effects can be triggered by companies if they make the right choices in developing their business models. Good business models create virtuous cycles that, over time, result in competitive advantage. Smart companies know how to strengthen their virtuous cycles, weaken those of rivals, and even use their virtuous cycles to turn competitors’ strengths into weaknesses.
“Isn’t that strategy?” we’re often asked. It isn’t—and unless managers learn to understand the distinct realms of business models, strategy, and tactics, while taking into account how they interact, they will never find the most effective ways to compete.
What Is a Business Model, Really?
Everyone agrees that executives must know how business models work if their organizations are to thrive, yet there continues to be little agreement on an operating definition. Management writer Joan Magretta defined a business model as “the story that explains how an enterprise works,” harking back to Peter Drucker, who described it as the answer to the questions: Who is your customer, what does the customer value, and how do you deliver value at an appropriate cost?
Other experts define a business model by specifying the main characteristics of a good one. For example, Harvard Business School’s Clay Christensen suggests that a business model should consist of four elements: a customer value proposition, a profit formula, key resources, and key processes. Such descriptions undoubtedly help executives evaluate business models, but they impose preconceptions about what they should look like and may constrain the development of radically different ones.
Our studies suggest that one component of a business model must be the choices that executives make about how the organization should operate—choices such as compensation practices, procurement contracts, location of facilities, extent of vertical integration, sales and marketing initiatives, and so on. Managerial choices, of course, have consequences. For instance, pricing (a choice) affects sales volume, which, in turn, shapes the company’s scale economies and bargaining power (both consequences). These consequences influence the company’s logic of value creation and value capture, so they too must have a place in the definition. In its simplest conceptualization, therefore, a business model consists of a set of managerial choices and the consequences of those choices.
Companies make three types of choices when creating business models. Policy choices determine the actions an organization takes across all its operations (such as using nonunion workers, locating plants in rural areas, or encouraging employees to fly coach class). Asset choices pertain to the tangible resources a company deploys (manufacturing facilities or satellite communication systems, for instance). And governance choices refer to how a company arranges decision-making rights over the other two (should we own or lease machinery?). Seemingly innocuous differences in the governance of policies and assets influence their effectiveness a great deal.
Consequences can be either flexible or rigid. A flexible consequence is one that responds quickly when the underlying choice changes. For example, choosing to increase prices will immediately result in lower volumes. By contrast, a company’s culture of frugality—built over time through policies that oblige employees to fly economy class, share hotel rooms, and work out of Spartan offices—is unlikely to disappear immediately even when those choices change, making it a rigid consequence. These distinctions are important because they affect competitiveness. Unlike flexible consequences, rigid ones are difficult to imitate because companies need time to build them.
Take, for instance, Ryanair, which switched in the early 1990s from a traditional business model to a low-cost one. The Irish airline eliminated all frills, cut costs, and slashed prices to unheard-of levels. The choices the company made included offering low fares, flying out of only secondary airports, catering to only one class of passenger, charging for all additional services, serving no meals, making only short-haul flights, and utilizing a standardized fleet of Boeing 737s.
 It also chose to use a nonunionized workforce, offer high-powered incentives to employees, operate out of a lean headquarters, and so on. The consequences of those choices were high volumes, low variable and fixed costs, a reputation for reasonable fares, and an aggressive management team, to name a few. (See “Ryanair’s Business Model Then and Now.”) The result is a business model that enables Ryanair to offer a decent level of service at a low cost without radically lowering customers’ willingness to pay for its tickets.

How Business Models Generate Virtuous Cycles
Not all business models work equally well, of course. Good ones share certain characteristics: They align with the company’s goals, are self-reinforcing, and are robust. (See the sidebar “Three Characteristics of a Good Business Model.”) Above all, successful business models generate virtuous cycles, or feedback loops, that are self-reinforcing. This is the most powerful and neglected aspect of business models.

Our studies show that the competitive advantage of high-tech companies such as Apple, Microsoft, and Intel stems largely from their accumulated assets—an installed base of iPods, Xboxes, or PCs, for instance. The leaders gathered those assets not by buying them but by making smart choices about pricing, royalties, product range, and so on. In other words, they’re consequences of business model choices. Any enterprise can make choices that allow it to build assets or resources—be they project management skills, production experience, reputation, asset utilization, trust, or bargaining power—that make a difference in its sector.
The consequences enable further choices, and so on. This process generates virtuous cycles that continuously strengthen the business model, creating a dynamic that’s similar to that of network effects. As the cycles spin, stocks of the company’s key assets (or resources) grow, enhancing the enterprise’s competitive advantage. Smart companies design business models to trigger virtuous cycles that, over time, expand both value creation and capture.
For example, Ryanair’s business model creates several virtuous cycles that maximize its profits through increasingly low costs and prices. (See the exhibit “Ryanair’s Key Virtuous Cycles.”) All of the cycles result in reduced costs, which allow for lower prices that grow sales and ultimately lead to increased profits. Its competitive advantage keeps growing as long as the virtuous cycles generated by its business model spin. Just as a fast-moving body is hard to stop because of kinetic energy, it’s tough to halt well-functioning virtuous cycles.

However, they don’t go on forever. They usually reach a limit and trigger counterbalancing cycles, or they slow down because of their interactions with other business models. In fact, when interrupted, the synergies work in the opposite direction and erode competitive advantage. For example, one of Ryanair’s cycles could become vicious if its employees unionized and demanded higher wages, and the airline could no longer offer the lowest fares. It would then lose volume, and aircraft utilization would fall. Since Ryanair’s investment in its fleet assumes a very high rate of utilization, this change would have a magnified effect on profitability.
It’s easy to see that virtuous cycles can be created by a low-cost, no-frills player, but a differentiator may also create virtuous cycles. Take the case of Irizar, a Spanish manufacturer of bodies for luxury motor coaches, which posted large losses after a series of ill-conceived moves in the 1980s. Irizar’s leadership changed twice in 1990 and morale hit an all-time low, prompting the new head of the company’s steering team, Koldo Saratxaga, to make major changes. He transformed the organization’s business model by making choices that yielded three rigid consequences: employees’ tremendous sense of ownership, feelings of accomplishment, and trust. The choices included eliminating hierarchy, decentralizing decision making, focusing on teams to get work done, and having workers own the assets. (See the exhibit “Irizar’s Novel Business Model.”)

Irizar’s main objective, as a cooperative, is to increase the number of well-paying jobs in the Basque Country, so the company developed a business model that generates a great deal of customer value. Its key virtuous cycle connects customers’ willingness to pay with relatively low cost, generating high profits that feed innovation, service, and high quality. In fact, quality is the cornerstone of Irizar’s culture. Focusing on customer loyalty and an empowered workforce, the company enjoyed a 23.9% compound annual growth rate over the 14 years that Saratxaga was CEO. Producing 4,000 coaches in 2010 and generating revenues of about €400 million, Irizar is an example of a radically different business model that generates virtuous cycles.
Competing with Business Models
It’s easy to infuse virtuousness in cycles when there are no competitors, but few business models operate in vacuums—at least, not for long. To compete with rivals that have similar business models, companies must quickly build rigid consequences so that they can create and capture more value than rivals do. It’s a different story when enterprises compete against dissimilar business models; the results are often unpredictable, and it’s tough to know which business model will perform well.
Take, for instance, the battle between two of Finland’s dominant retailers: S Group, a consumers’ cooperative, and Kesko, which uses entrepreneur-retailers to own and operate its stores. We’ve tracked the firms for over a decade, and Kesko’s business model appears to be superior: The incentives it offers franchisees should result in rapid growth and high profits. However, it turns out that the S Group’s business model hurts Kesko more than Kesko’s affects the S Group. Since customers own the S Group, the retailer often reduces prices and increases customer bonuses, which allows it to gain market share from Kesko. 
That forces Kesko to lower its prices and its profits fall, demotivating its entrepreneur-retailers. As a result, Kesko underperforms the S Group. Over time, the S Group’s opaque corporate governance system allows slack to creep into the system, and it is forced to hike prices. This allows Kesko to also increase prices and improve profitability, drive its entrepreneur-retailers, and win back more customers through its superior shopping experience. That sparks another cycle of rivalry.
Companies can compete through business models in three ways: They can strengthen their own virtuous cycles, block or destroy the cycles of rivals, or build complementarities with rivals’ cycles, which results in substitutes mutating into complements.
Strengthen your virtuous cycle.
Companies can modify their business models to generate new virtuous cycles that enable them to compete more effectively with rivals. These cycles often have consequences that strengthen cycles elsewhere in the business model. Until recently, Boeing and Airbus competed using essentially the same virtuous cycles. Airbus matched Boeing’s offerings in every segment, the exception being the very large commercial transport segment where Boeing had launched the 747 in 1969. Given the lumpiness of demand for aircraft, their big-ticket nature, and cyclicality, price competition has been intense.


Historically, Boeing held the upper hand because its 747 enjoyed a monopoly, and it could reinvest those profits to strengthen its position in other segments. Analysts estimate that the 747 contributed 70 cents to every dollar of Boeing’s profits by the early 1990s. Since R&D investment is the most important driver of customers’ willingness to pay, Airbus was at a disadvantage. It stayed afloat by obtaining low-interest loans from European governments. Without the subsidies, Airbus’s cycle would have become vicious.
With the subsidies likely to dry up, Airbus modified its business model by developing a very large commercial transport, the 380. To dissuade Airbus, Boeing announced a stretch version of the 747. However, that aircraft would cut into the 747’s profits, so it seems unlikely that Boeing will ever launch it. Not only does the 380 help maintain the virtuousness of Airbus’s cycle in small and midsize planes, but also it helps decelerate the virtuousness of Boeing’s cycle. The increase in rivalry suggests that the 747 will become less of a money-spinner for Boeing. That’s why it is trying to strengthen its position in midsize aircraft, where competition is likely to become even tougher when sales of the 380 take off, by developing the 787.
Weaken competitors’ cycles.
Some companies get ahead by using the rigid consequences of their choices to weaken new entrants’ virtuous cycles. Whether a new technology disrupts an industry or not depends not only on the intrinsic benefits of that technology but also on interactions with other players. Consider, for instance, the battle between Microsoft and Linux, which feeds its virtuous cycle by being free of charge and allowing users to contribute code improvements. 
Unlike Airbus, Microsoft has focused on weakening its competitor’s virtuous cycle. It uses its relationship with OEMs to have Windows preinstalled on PCs and laptops so that it can prevent Linux from growing its customer base. It discourages people from taking advantage of Linux’s free operating system and applications by spreading fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the products.
In the future, Microsoft could raise Windows’ value by learning more from users and offering special prices to increase sales in the education sector, or decrease Linux’s value by undercutting purchases by strategic buyers and preventing Windows applications from running on Linux. Linux’s value creation potential may theoretically be greater than that of Windows, but its installed base will never eclipse that of Microsoft as long as the software giant succeeds in disrupting its key virtuous cycles.
Turn competitors into complements.
Rivals with different business models can also become partners in value creation. In 1999, Betfair, an online betting exchange, took on British bookmakers such as Ladbrokes and William Hill by enabling people to anonymously place bets against one another. Unlike traditional bookmakers who only offer odds, Betfair is a two-sided internet-based platform that allows customers to both place bets and offer odds to others. One-sided and two-sided businesses have different virtuous cycles: While bookmakers create value by managing risk and capture it through the odds they offer, betting exchanges themselves bear no risk. They create value by matching the two sides of the market and capture it by taking a cut of the net winnings.
Over the past decade, Ladbrokes’ and William Hill’s gross winnings have declined, so Betfair has hurt them, but not as much as expected. Because Betfair has improved odds in general, gamblers lose less money. They then place more wagers, and when bookies pay out, bettors gamble again, feeding a virtuous cycle. This has expanded the British gambling market by a larger proportion than just the improvement of odds might suggest. 
The better odds Betfair offers also help traditional bookmakers gauge market sentiment more accurately and hedge their exposures at a lower cost. When a new business model creates complementarities between competitors, it is less likely that incumbents will respond aggressively. The initial reaction from bookmakers to Betfair was hostile, but they have become more accommodating of its presence ever since.
Business Models vs. Strategy vs. Tactics
No three concepts are of as much use to managers or as misunderstood as strategy, business models, and tactics. Many use the terms synonymously, which can lead to poor decision making.
To be sure, the three are interrelated. Whereas business models refer to the logic of the company—how it operates and creates and captures value for stakeholders in a competitive marketplace—strategy is the plan to create a unique and valuable position involving a distinctive set of activities. That definition implies that the enterprise has made a choice about how it wishes to compete in the marketplace. 
The system of choices and consequences is a reflection of the strategy, but it isn’t the strategy; it’s the business model. Strategy refers to the contingent plan about which business model to use. The key word is contingent; strategies contain provisions against a range of contingencies (such as competitors’ moves or environmental shocks), whether or not they take place. While every organization has a business model, not every organization has a strategy—a plan of action for contingencies that may arise.
Consider Ryanair. The airline was on the brink of bankruptcy in the 1990s, and the strategy it chose to reinvent itself was to become the Southwest Airlines of Europe. The new logic of the organization—its way of creating and capturing value for stakeholders—was Ryanair’s new business model.
Changing strategic choices can be expensive, but enterprises still have a range of options to compete that are comparatively easy and inexpensive to deploy. These are tactics—the residual choices open to a company by virtue of the business model that it employs. Business models determine the tactics available to compete in the marketplace. For instance, Metro, the world’s largest newspaper, has created an ad-sponsored business model that dictates that the product must be free. That precludes Metro from using price as a tactic.
Think of a business model as if it were an automobile. Different car designs function differently—conventional engines operate quite differently from hybrids, and standard transmissions from automatics—and create different value for drivers. The way the automobile is built places constraints on what the driver can do; it determines which tactics the driver can use. A low-powered compact would create more value for the driver who wants to maneuver through the narrow streets of Barcelona’s Gothic Quarter than would a large SUV, in which the task would be impossible.
 Imagine that the driver could modify the features of the car: shape, power, fuel consumption, seats. Such modifications would not be tactical; they would constitute strategies because they would entail changing the machine (the “business model”) itself. In sum, strategy is designing and building the car, the business model is the car, and tactics are how you drive the car.
Strategy focuses on building competitive advantage by defending a unique position or exploiting a valuable and idiosyncratic set of resources. Those positions and resources are created by virtuous cycles, so executives should develop business models that activate those cycles. 
That’s tough, especially because of their interactions with those of other players such as competitors, complementors, customers, and suppliers that are all fighting to create and capture value too. That’s the essence of competitiveness—and developing strategy, tactics, or innovative business models has never been easy.