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Showing posts with label Digital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Digital. Show all posts

Monday, March 20, 2017

The case for digital reinvention 03-21


Digital technology, despite its seeming ubiquity, has only begun to penetrate industries. As it continues its advance, the implications for revenues, profits, and opportunities will be dramatic.







Image credit : Shyam's Imagination Library



As new markets emerge, profit pools shift, and digital technologies pervade more of everyday life, it’s easy to assume that the economy’s digitization is already far advanced. According to our latest research, however, the forces of digital have yet to become fully mainstream. On average, industries are less than 40 percent digitized, despite the relatively deep penetration of these technologies in media, retail, and high tech.

As digitization penetrates more fully, it will dampen revenue and profit growth for some, particularly the bottom quartile of companies, according to our research, while the top quartile captures disproportionate gains. Bold, tightly integrated digital strategies will be the biggest differentiator between companies that win and companies that don’t, and the biggest payouts will go to those that initiate digital disruptions. Fast-followers with operational excellence and superior organizational health won’t be far behind.

The case for digital reinvention 


As digitization penetrates more fully, it will dampen revenue and profit growth for some, particularly the bottom quartile of companies, according to our research, while the top quartile captures disproportionate gains. Bold, tightly integrated digital strategies will be the biggest differentiator between companies that win and companies that don’t, and the biggest payouts will go to those that initiate digital disruptions. Fast-followers with operational excellence and superior organizational health won’t be far behind.

These findings emerged from a research effort to understand the nature, extent, and top-management implications of the progress of digitization. We tailored our efforts to examine its effects along multiple dimensions: products and services, marketing and distribution channels, business processes, supply chains, and new entrants at the ecosystem level (for details, see sidebar “About the research”). We sought to understand how economic performance will change as digitization continues its advance along these different dimensions. What are the best-performing companies doing in the face of rising pressure? Which approach is more important as digitization progresses: a great strategy with average execution or an average strategy with great execution?

The research-survey findings, taken together, amount to a clear mandate to act decisively, whether through the creation of new digital businesses or by reinventing the core of today’s strategic, operational, and organizational approaches.

More digitization—and performance pressure—ahead

According to our research, digitization has only begun to transform many industries (Exhibit 1). Its impact on the economic performance of companies, while already significant, is far from complete.

Contd 2.........

Page 2, 3, 4, 5

Monday, December 5, 2016

Making data analytics work for you—instead of the other way around 12-06



Does your data have a purpose? If not, you’re spinning your wheels. Here’s how to discover one and then translate it into action.
          
The data-analytics revolution now under way has the potential to transform how companies organize, operate, manage talent, and create value. That’s starting to happen in a few companies—typically ones that are reaping major rewards from their data—but it’s far from the norm. There’s a simple reason: CEOs and other top executives, the only people who can drive the broader business changes needed to fully exploit advanced analytics, tend to avoid getting dragged into the esoteric “weeds.” On one level, this is understandable. The complexity of the methodologies, the increasing importance of machine learning, and the sheer scale of the data sets make it tempting for senior leaders to “leave it to the experts.”

But that’s also a mistake. Advanced data analytics is a quintessential business matter. That means the CEO and other top executives must be able to clearly articulate its purpose and then translate it into action—not just in an analytics department, but throughout the organization where the insights will be used.

This article describes eight critical elements contributing to clarity of purpose and an ability to act. We’re convinced that leaders with strong intuition about both don’t just become better equipped to “kick the tires” on their analytics efforts. They can also more capably address many of the critical and complementary top-management challenges facing them: the need to ground even the highest analytical aspirations in traditional business principles, the importance of deploying a range of tools and employing the right personnel, and the necessity of applying hard metrics and asking hard questions. All that, in turn, boosts the odds of improving corporate performance through analytics.


After all, performance—not pristine data sets, interesting patterns, or killer algorithms—is ultimately the point. Advanced data analytics is a means to an end. It’s a discriminating tool to identify, and then implement, a value-driving answer. And you’re much likelier to land on a meaningful one if you’re clear on the purpose of your data (which we address in this article’s first four principles) and the uses you’ll be putting your data to (our focus in the next four). That answer will of course look different in different companies, industries, and geographies, whose relative sophistication with advanced data analytics is all over the map. Whatever your starting point, though, the insights unleashed by analytics should be at the core of your organization’s approach to define and improve performance continually as competitive dynamics evolve. Otherwise, you’re not making advanced analytics work for you.

‘Purpose-driven’ data

“Better performance” will mean different things to different companies. And it will mean that different types of data should be isolated, aggregated, and analyzed depending upon the specific use case. Sometimes, data points are hard to find, and, certainly, not all data points are equal. But it’s the data points that help meet your specific purpose that have the most value.

Ask the right questions

The precise question your organization should ask depends on your best-informed priorities. Clarity is essential. Examples of good questions include “how can we reduce costs?” or “how can we increase revenues?” Even better are questions that drill further down: “How can we improve the productivity of each member of our team?” “How can we improve the quality of outcomes for patients?” “How can we radically speed our time to market for product development?” Think about how you can align important functions and domains with your most important use cases. Iterate through to actual business examples, and probe to where the value lies. In the real world of hard constraints on funds and time, analytic exercises rarely pay off for vaguer questions such as “what patterns do the data points show?”

One large financial company erred by embarking on just that sort of open-ended exercise: it sought to collect as much data as possible and then see what turned up. When findings emerged that were marginally interesting but monetarily insignificant, the team refocused. With strong C-suite support, it first defined a clear purpose statement aimed at reducing time in product development and then assigned a specific unit of measure to that purpose, focused on the rate of customer adoption. A sharper focus helped the company introduce successful products for two market segments. Similarly, another organization we know plunged into data analytics by first creating a “data lake.” It spent an inordinate amount of time (years, in fact) to make the data pristine but invested hardly any thought in determining what the use cases should be. Management has since begun to clarify its most pressing issues. But the world is rarely patient.

Had these organizations put the question horse before the data-collection cart, they surely would have achieved an impact sooner, even if only portions of the data were ready to be mined. For example, a prominent automotive company focused immediately on the foundational question of how to improve its profits. It then bore down to recognize that the greatest opportunity would be to decrease the development time (and with it the costs) incurred in aligning its design and engineering functions. Once the company had identified that key focus point, it proceeded to unlock deep insights from ten years of R&D history—which resulted in remarkably improved development times and, in turn, higher profits.

Think really small . . . and very big

The smallest edge can make the biggest difference. Consider the remarkable photograph below from the 1896 Olympics, taken at the starting line of the 100-meter dash. Only one of the runners, Thomas Burke, crouched in the now-standard four-point stance. The race began in the next moment, and 12 seconds later Burke took the gold; the time saved by his stance helped him do it. Today, sprinters start in this way as a matter of course—a good analogy for the business world, where rivals adopt best practices rapidly and competitive advantages are difficult to sustain.





The variety of stances among runners in the 100-meter sprint at the first modern Olympic Games, held in Athens in 1896, is surprising to the modern viewer. Thomas Burke (second from left) is the only runner in the crouched stance—considered best practice today—an advantage that helped him win one of his two gold medals at the Games.

The good news is that intelligent players can still improve their performance and spurt back into the lead. Easy fixes are unlikely, but companies can identify small points of difference to amplify and exploit. The impact of “big data” analytics is often manifested by thousands—or more—of incrementally small improvements. If an organization can atomize a single process into its smallest parts and implement advances where possible, the payoffs can be profound. And if an organization can systematically combine small improvements across bigger, multiple processes, the payoff can be exponential.

Just about everything businesses do can be broken down into component parts. GE embeds sensors in its aircraft engines to track each part of their performance in real time, allowing for quicker adjustments and greatly reducing maintenance downtime. But if that sounds like the frontier of high tech (and it is), consider consumer packaged goods. We know a leading CPG company that sought to increase margins on one of its well-known breakfast brands. It deconstructed the entire manufacturing process into sequential increments and then, with advanced analytics, scrutinized each of them to see where it could unlock value. In this case, the answer was found in the oven: adjusting the baking temperature by a tiny fraction not only made the product taste better but also made production less expensive. The proof was in the eating—and in an improved P&L.

When a series of processes can be decoupled, analyzed, and resynched together in a system that is more universe than atom, the results can be even more powerful. A large steel manufacturer used various analytics techniques to study critical stages of its business model, including demand planning and forecasting, procurement, and inventory management. In each process, it isolated critical value drivers and scaled back or eliminated previously undiscovered inefficiencies, for savings of about 5 to 10 percent. Those gains, which rested on hundreds of small improvements made possible by data analytics, proliferated when the manufacturer was able to tie its processes together and transmit information across each stage in near real time. By rationalizing an end-to-end system linking demand planning all the way through inventory management, the manufacturer realized savings approaching 50 percent—hundreds of millions of dollars in all.

Embrace taboos

Beware the phrase “garbage in, garbage out”; the mantra has become so embedded in business thinking that it sometimes prevents insights from coming to light. In reality, useful data points come in different shapes and sizes—and are often latent within the organization, in the form of free-text maintenance reports or PowerPoint presentations, among multiple examples. Too frequently, however, quantitative teams disregard inputs because the quality is poor, inconsistent, or dated and dismiss imperfect information because it doesn’t feel like “data.”

But we can achieve sharper conclusions if we make use of fuzzier stuff. In day-to-day life—when one is not creating, reading, or responding to an Excel model—even the most hard-core “quant” processes a great deal of qualitative information, much of it soft and seemingly taboo for data analytics—in a nonbinary way. We understand that there are very few sure things; we weigh probabilities, contemplate upsides, and take subtle hints into account. Think about approaching a supermarket queue, for example. Do you always go to register four? Or do you notice that, today, one worker seems more efficient, one customer seems to be holding cash instead of a credit card, one cashier does not have an assistant to help with bagging, and one shopping cart has items that will need to be weighed and wrapped separately? All this is soft “intel,” to be sure, and some of the data points are stronger than others. But you’d probably consider each of them and more when you decided where to wheel your cart. Just because line four moved fastest the last few times doesn’t mean it will move fastest today.

In fact, while hard and historical data points are valuable, they have their limits. One company we know experienced them after instituting a robust investment-approval process. Understandably mindful of squandering capital resources, management insisted that it would finance no new products without waiting for historical, provable information to support a projected ROI. Unfortunately, this rigor resulted in overly long launch periods—so long that the company kept mistiming the market. It was only after relaxing the data constraints to include softer inputs such as industry forecasts, predictions from product experts, and social-media commentary that the company was able to get a more accurate feel for current market conditions and time its product launches accordingly.
Of course, Twitter feeds are not the same as telematics. But just because information may be incomplete, based on conjecture, or notably biased does not mean that it should be treated as “garbage.” Soft information does have value. Sometimes, it may even be essential, especially when people try to “connect the dots” between more exact inputs or make a best guess for the emerging future.

To optimize available information in an intelligent, nuanced way, companies should strive to build a strong data provenance model that identifies the source of every input and scores its reliability, which may improve or degrade over time. Recording the quality of data—and the methodologies used to determine it—is not only a matter of transparency but also a form of risk management. All companies compete under uncertainty, and sometimes the data underlying a key decision may be less certain than one would like. A well-constructed provenance model can stress-test the confidence for a go/no-go decision and help management decide when to invest in improving a critical data set.

Connect the dots

Insights often live at the boundaries. Just as considering soft data can reveal new insights, combining one’s sources of information can make those insights sharper still. Too often, organizations drill down on a single data set in isolation but fail to consider what different data sets convey in conjunction. For example, HR may have thorough employee-performance data; operations, comprehensive information about specific assets; and finance, pages of backup behind a P&L. Examining each cache of information carefully is certainly useful. But additional untapped value may be nestled in the gullies among separate data sets.

One industrial company provides an instructive example. The core business used a state-of-the-art machine that could undertake multiple processes. It also cost millions of dollars per unit, and the company had bought hundreds of them—an investment of billions. The machines provided best-in-class performance data, and the company could, and did, measure how each unit functioned over time. It would not be a stretch to say that keeping the machines up and running was critical to the company’s success.

Even so, the machines required longer and more costly repairs than management had expected, and every hour of downtime affected the bottom line. Although a very capable analytics team embedded in operations sifted through the asset data meticulously, it could not find a credible cause for the breakdowns. Then, when the performance results were considered in conjunction with information provided by HR, the reason for the subpar output became clear: machines were missing their scheduled maintenance checks because the personnel responsible were absent at critical times. Payment incentives, not equipment specifications, were the real root cause. A simple fix solved the problem, but it became apparent only when different data sets were examined together.

From outputs to action

One visual that comes to mind in the case of the preceding industrial company is that of a Venn Diagram: when you look at 2 data sets side by side, a key insight becomes clear through the overlap. And when you consider 50 data sets, the insights are even more powerful—if the quest for diverse data doesn’t create overwhelming complexity that actually inhibits the use of analytics. To avoid this problem, leaders should push their organizations to take a multifaceted approach in analyzing data. If analyses are run in silos, if the outputs do not work under real-world conditions, or, perhaps worst of all, if the conclusions would work but sit unused, the analytics exercise has failed.

Run loops, not lines

Data analytics needs a purpose and a plan. But as the saying goes, “no battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy.” To that, we’d add another military insight—the OODA loop, first conceived by US colonel John Boyd: the decision cycle of observe, orient, decide, and act. Victory, Boyd posited, often resulted from the way decisions are made; the side that reacts to situations more quickly and processes new information more accurately should prevail. The decision process, in other words, is a loop or—more correctly—a dynamic series of loops (exhibit).






Best-in-class organizations adopt this approach to their competitive advantage. Google, for one, insistently makes data-focused decisions, builds consumer feedback into solutions, and rapidly iterates products that people not only use but love. A loops-not-lines approach works just as well outside of Silicon Valley. We know of a global pharmaceutical company, for instance, that tracks and monitors its data to identify key patterns, moves rapidly to intervene when data points suggest that a process may move off track, and refines its feedback loop to speed new medications through trials. And a consumer-electronics OEM moved quickly from collecting data to “doing the math” with an iterative, hypothesis-driven modeling cycle. It first created an interim data architecture, building three “insights factories” that could generate actionable recommendations for its highest-priority use cases, and then incorporated feedback in parallel. All of this enabled its early pilots to deliver quick, largely self-funding results.

Digitized data points are now speeding up feedback cycles. By using advanced algorithms and machine learning that improves with the analysis of every new input, organizations can run loops that are faster and better. But while machine learning very much has its place in any analytics tool kit, it is not the only tool to use, nor do we expect it to supplant all other analyses. We’ve mentioned circular Venn Diagrams; people more partial to three-sided shapes might prefer the term “triangulate.” But the concept is essentially the same: to arrive at a more robust answer, use a variety of analytics techniques and combine them in different ways.

In our experience, even organizations that have built state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithms and use automated looping will benefit from comparing their results against a humble univariate or multivariate analysis. The best loops, in fact, involve people and machines. A dynamic, multipronged decision process will outperform any single algorithm—no matter how advanced—by testing, iterating, and monitoring the way the quality of data improves or degrades; incorporating new data points as they become available; and making it possible to respond intelligently as events unfold.

Make your output usable—and beautiful

While the best algorithms can work wonders, they can’t speak for themselves in boardrooms. And data scientists too often fall short in articulating what they’ve done. That’s hardly surprising; companies hiring for technical roles rightly prioritize quantitative expertise over presentation skills. But mind the gap, or face the consequences. One world-class manufacturer we know employed a team that developed a brilliant algorithm for the options pricing of R&D projects. The data points were meticulously parsed, the analyses were intelligent and robust, and the answers were essentially correct. But the organization’s decision makers found the end product somewhat complicated and didn’t use it.

We’re all human after all, and appearances matter. That’s why a beautiful interface will get you a longer look than a detailed computation with an uneven personality. That’s also why the elegant, intuitive usability of products like the iPhone or the Nest thermostat is making its way into the enterprise. Analytics should be consumable, and best-in-class organizations now include designers on their core analytics teams. We’ve found that workers throughout an organization will respond better to interfaces that make key findings clear and that draw users in.

Build a multiskilled team

Drawing your users in—and tapping the capabilities of different individuals across your organization to do so—is essential. Analytics is a team sport. Decisions about which analyses to employ, what data sources to mine, and how to present the findings are matters of human judgment.

Assembling a great team is a bit like creating a gourmet delight—you need a mix of fine ingredients and a dash of passion. Key team members include data scientists, who help develop and apply complex analytical methods; engineers with skills in areas such as microservices, data integration, and distributed computing; cloud and data architects to provide technical and systemwide insights; and user-interface developers and creative designers to ensure that products are visually beautiful and intuitively useful. You also need “translators”—men and women who connect the disciplines of IT and data analytics with business decisions and management.

In our experience—and, we expect, in yours as well—the demand for people with the necessary capabilities decidedly outstrips the supply. We’ve also seen that simply throwing money at the problem by paying a premium for a cadre of new employees typically doesn’t work. What does is a combination: a few strategic hires, generally more senior people to help lead an analytics group; in some cases, strategic acquisitions or partnerships with small data-analytics service firms; and, especially, recruiting and reskilling current employees with quantitative backgrounds to join in-house analytics teams.

We’re familiar with several financial institutions and a large industrial company that pursued some version of these paths to build best-in-class advanced data-analytics groups. A key element of each organization’s success was understanding both the limits that any one individual can be expected to contribute and the potential that an engaged team with complementary talents can collectively achieve. On occasion, one can find “rainbow unicorn” employees who embody most or all of the needed capabilities. It’s a better bet, though, to build a collaborative team comprising people who collectively have all the necessary skills.

That starts, of course, with people at the “point of the spear”—those who actively parse through the data points and conduct the hard analytics. Over time, however, we expect that organizations will move to a model in which people across functions use analytics as part of their daily activities. Already, the characteristics of promising data-minded employees are not hard to see: they are curious thinkers who can focus on detail, get energized by ambiguity, display openness to diverse opinions and a willingness to iterate together to produce insights that make sense, and are committed to real-world outcomes. That last point is critical because your company is not supposed to be running some cool science experiment (however cool the analytics may be) in isolation. You and your employees are striving to discover practicable insights—and to ensure that the insights are used.

Make adoption your deliverable

Culture makes adoption possible. And from the moment your organization embarks on its analytics journey, it should be clear to everyone that math, data, and even design are not enough: the real power comes from adoption. An algorithm should not be a point solution—companies must embed analytics in the operating models of real-world processes and day-to-day work flows. Bill Klem, the legendary baseball umpire, famously said, “It ain’t nothin’ until I call it.” Data analytics ain’t nothin’ until you use it.

We’ve seen too many unfortunate instances that serve as cautionary tales—from detailed (and expensive) seismology forecasts that team foremen didn’t use to brilliant (and amazingly accurate) flight-system indicators that airplane pilots ignored. In one particularly striking case, a company we know had seemingly pulled everything together: it had a clearly defined mission to increase top-line growth, robust data sources intelligently weighted and mined, stellar analytics, and insightful conclusions on cross-selling opportunities. There was even an elegant interface in the form of pop-ups that would appear on the screen of call-center representatives, automatically triggered by voice-recognition software, to prompt certain products, based on what the customer was saying in real time. Utterly brilliant—except the representatives kept closing the pop-up windows and ignoring the prompts. Their pay depended more on getting through calls quickly and less on the number and type of products they sold.

When everyone pulls together, though, and incentives are aligned, the results can be remarkable. For example, one aerospace firm needed to evaluate a range of R&D options for its next-generation products but faced major technological, market, and regulatory challenges that made any outcome uncertain. Some technology choices seemed to offer safer bets in light of historical results, and other, high-potential opportunities appeared to be emerging but were as yet unproved. Coupled with an industry trajectory that appeared to be shifting from a product- to service-centric model, the range of potential paths and complex “pros” and “cons” required a series of dynamic—and, of course, accurate—decisions.

By framing the right questions, stress-testing the options, and, not least, communicating the trade-offs with an elegant, interactive visual model that design skills made beautiful and usable, the organization discovered that increasing investment along one R&D path would actually keep three technology options open for a longer period. This bought the company enough time to see which way the technology would evolve and avoided the worst-case outcome of being locked into a very expensive, and very wrong, choice. One executive likened the resulting flexibility to “the choice of betting on a horse at the beginning of the race or, for a premium, being able to bet on a horse halfway through the race.”

It’s not a coincidence that this happy ending concluded as the initiative had begun: with senior management’s engagement. In our experience, the best day-one indicator for a successful data-analytics program is not the quality of data at hand, or even the skill-level of personnel in house, but the commitment of company leadership. It takes a C-suite perspective to help identify key business questions, foster collaboration across functions, align incentives, and insist that insights be used. Advanced data analytics is wonderful, but your organization should not be working merely to put an advanced-analytics initiative in place. The very point, after all, is to put analytics to work for you.

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Friday, June 10, 2016

An incumbent’s guide to digital disruption 06-11


























Image credit : Shyam's Imagination Library



Incumbents needn’t be victims of disruption if they recognize the crucial thresholds in their life cycle, and act in time.
          
A decade ago, Norwegian media group Schibsted made a courageous decision: to offer classifieds—the main revenue source of its newspaper businesses—online for free. The company had already made significant Internet investments but realized that to establish a pan-European digital stronghold it had to raise the stakes. During a presentation to a prospective French partner, Schibsted executives pointed out that existing European classifieds sites had limited traffic. “The market is up for grabs,” they said, “and we intend to get it.” Today, more than 80 percent of their earnings come from online classifieds.



Our framework for understanding the life cycle of industry disruption.
      
About that same time, the boards of other leading newspapers were also weighing the prospect of a digital future. No doubt, like Schibsted, they even developed and debated hypothetical scenarios in which Internet start-ups siphoned off the lucrative print classified ads the industry called its “rivers of gold.” Maybe these scenarios appeared insufficiently alarming—or maybe they were too dangerous to even entertain. But very few newspapers followed Schibsted’s path.  


From the vantage point of 2016, when print media lie shattered by a tsunami of digital disruption, it’s easy to talk about who made the “right” decision and who the “wrong.” Things are far murkier when one is actually in the midst of disruption’s uncertain, oft-hyped early stages. In the 1980s, steel giants famously underestimated the potential of mini-mills. In the 1980s and 1990s, the personal computer put a stop to Digital Equipment Corporation, Wang Laboratories, and other minicomputer makers. More recently, web retailers have disrupted physical ones, and Airbnb and Uber Technologies have disrupted lodging and car travel, respectively. The examples run the gamut from database software to boxed beef.

What they have in common is how often incumbents find themselves on the wrong side of a big trend. No matter how strong their ingoing balance sheets and market share—and sometimes because of those very factors—incumbents can’t seem to hold back the tide. The champions of disruption are far more often the attackers than the established incumbent. The good news for incumbents is that many industries are still in the early days of digital disruption. Print media, travel, and lodging provide valuable illustrations of the path increasingly more will follow. For most, it’s early enough to respond. (For a quick guide to assessing your organization's position in the digital disruption journey,
What’s the secret of those incumbents that do survive—and sometimes even thrive?

One aspect surely relates to the ability to recognize and overcome the typical pattern of response (or lack thereof) that characterizes companies in the incumbent’s position. This most often requires acuity of foresight3 and a willingness to respond boldly before it’s too late, which usually means acting before it is obvious you have to do so. As Reed Hastings, the CEO of Netflix, pointed out (right as his company was making the leap from DVDs to streaming), most successful organizations fail to look for new things their customers want because they’re afraid to hurt their core businesses.

Clayton Christensen called this phenomenon the innovator’s dilemma. Hastings simply said, “Companies rarely die from moving too fast, and they frequently die from moving too slowly.”4
We are all great strategists in hindsight. The question is what to do when you are in the middle of it all, under the real-world constraints and pressures of running a large, modern company. This article looks at the four stages of disruption from an incumbent’s perspective, the barriers to overcome, and the choices and responses needed at each stage.

Where you are and what you need

It may help to view these stages on an S-curve (exhibit). At first, young companies struggle with uncertainty but are agile and willing to experiment. At this time, companies prize learning and optionality and work toward creating value based on the expectation of future earnings. The new model then needs to reach some critical mass to become a going concern. As they mature—that is, become incumbents—mind-sets and realities change. The established companies lock in routines and processes. They iron out and standardize variability amid growing organizational complexity. In the quest for efficiency, they weed out strategic options and reward executives for steady results. The measure of success is now delivery of consistent, growing cash flows in the here and now. The option-rich expectancy of future gain is replaced by the treadmill of continually escalating performance expectations.






In a disruption, the company heading toward the top of the old S-curve confronts a new business model at the bottom of a new S-curve. The circle of creative destruction is renewed, but this time the shoe is on the other foot. Two primary challenges emerge. The first is to recognize the new S-curve, which starts with a small slope, and often-unimpressive profitability, and at first does not demand attention. After all, most companies have shown they are very good at dealing with obvious emergencies, rapidly corralling resources and acting decisively. But they struggle to deal with the slow, quiet rise of an uncertain threat that does not announce itself. Second, the same factors that help companies operate strongly toward the top of an S-curve often hinder them at the bottom of a new one. Because different modes of operation are required, it’s hard to do the right thing—even when you think you know what the right thing might be.

This simplified model, of a new S-curve crashing slow motion into an old one, gives us a way to look at the problem from the incumbent’s perspective, and to appreciate the actual challenges each moment presents along the way. In the first stage, the new S-curve is not yet a curve at all. In the second, the new business model gets validated, but its impact is not forceful enough to fundamentally bend the performance trajectory of the incumbent. In the third stage, however, the new model gains a critical mass and its impact is clearly felt. In the fourth, the new model becomes the new normal as it reaches its own maturity.

Let’s step through these stages in sequence and see what is going on.

Stage one: Signals amidst the noise

In the late 1990s, PolyGram was one of the world’s top record labels, with a roster boasting Bob Marley, U2, and top classical artists. But, in 1998, Cornelis Boonstra, CEO of PolyGram’s Dutch parent, Koninklijke Philips, flew to New York, met with Goldman Sachs, and arranged to sell PolyGram to Seagram for $10.6 billion. Why? Because Boonstra had come across research showing that consumers were using the new recordable CD-ROM technology (which Philips coinvented) largely for one purpose: to copy music.

In hindsight, this is a good example of how, in the early stages of disruption, demand begins to “purify” and lose the distortions imposed on it by businesses.


The MP3 format had barely been invented, Napster was a mere gleam in Sean Parker’s eye, and PolyGram was riding at the top of its S-curve—but Boonstra detected the first signs of transformational change and decided to act swiftly and decisively. Within a decade, compact-disc and DVD sales in the United States dropped by more than 80 percent. Similarly, Telecom New Zealand foresaw the deteriorating economics of its Yellow Pages business and sold its directories business in 2007 for $2.2 billion (a nine-time revenue multiple)6 while numerous other telecom companies held on until the businesses were nearly worthless.


The newspaper industry had no shortage of similar signals. As early as 1964, media theorist Marshall McLuhan observed that the industry’s reliance on classified ads and stock-market quotes made it vulnerable: “Should an alternative source of easy access to such diverse daily information be found, the press will fold.” The rise of the Internet created just such a source, and start-ups such as eBay opened a new way for people to list goods for sale without the use of newspaper ads. Schibsted was one of the earliest media companies to both anticipate the threat and act on the opportunity. As early as 1999, the company became convinced that “The Internet is made for classifieds, and classifieds are made for the Internet.”


It’s not surprising that most others publishers didn’t react. At this early stage of disruption, incumbents feel barely any impact on their core businesses except in the distant periphery. In short, they don’t “need” to act. It takes rare acuity to make a pre-emptive move, likely in the face of conflicting demands from stakeholders. What’s more, it can be difficult to work out which trends to ignore and which to react to.

Gaining sharper insight, and escaping the myopia of this first stage, requires incumbents to challenge their own “story” and to disrupt long-standing (and sometimes implicit) beliefs about how to make money in a given industry. As our colleagues put it in a recent article, “These governing beliefs reflect widely shared notions about customer preferences, the role of technology, regulation, cost drivers, and the basis of competition and differentiation. They are often considered inviolable—until someone comes along to violate them.”


The process of reframing these governing beliefs involves identifying an industry’s foremost notion about value creation and then turning it on its head to find new forms and mechanisms for creating value.

Stage two: Change takes hold

The trend is now clear. The core technological and economic drivers have been validated. At this point, it’s essential for established companies to commit to nurturing new initiatives so that they can establish footholds in the new sphere. More important, they need to ensure that new ventures have autonomy from the core business, even if the goals of the two operations conflict. The idea is to act before one has to.

But with disruption’s impact still not big enough to dampen earnings momentum, motivation is often missing. Even as online classifieds for cars and real estate began to take off and Craigslist gained momentum, most newspaper publishers lacked a sense of urgency because their own market share remained largely unaffected. And it’s not like the new players were making millions (yet). There was no performance envy.

But Schibsted did find the necessary motivation. “When the dot-com bubble burst, we continued to invest, in spite of the fact that we didn’t know how we were going to make money online,” recalls then-CEO Kjell Aamot. “We also allowed the new products to compete with the old products.”10 Offering free online classifieds directly cannibalized its newspaper business, but Schibsted was willing to take the risk. The company didn’t just act; it acted radically.

Now, let’s openly acknowledge how hard it is for a company’s leaders to commit to supporting experimental ventures when the business is climbing the S-curve. When Netflix disrupted itself in 2011 by shifting focus from DVDs to streaming, its share price dropped by 80 percent. Few boards and investors can handle that kind of pain when the near-term need is debatable. The vague longer-term threat just doesn’t seem as dangerous as the immediate hardship. After all, incumbents have existing revenue streams to protect—start-ups only have upside to capture. Additionally, management teams are more comfortable developing strategies for businesses they know how to operate, and are naturally reluctant to enter a new game with rules they don’t understand.

The upshot: most incumbents dabble, making small investments that won’t flatten their current S-curve and guard against cannibalization. Usually, they focus too heavily on finding synergies (always looking for efficiency) rather than fostering radical experimentation. The illusion that this dabbling is getting you into the game is all too tempting to believe. Many newspapers built online add-ons to their classified businesses, but few were willing to risk cannibalizing the traditional revenue streams, which at this point were still far bigger and more profitable. And remember, at this time, Schibsted had not yet been rewarded for its early action: its results looked pretty similar to its peers.

In time, of course, bolder action becomes necessary, and executives must commit to nurturing potentially dilutive and small next-horizon businesses in a pipeline of initiatives. Managing such a portfolio requires high tolerance for ambiguity, and it requires executives to adapt to shifting conditions, both inside and outside the company, even as the aspiration to deliver favorable outcomes for shareholders remains constant.11 The difficulty is the tendency to protect the core at the expense of the periphery. Not only are there strong, short-term financial incentives to protect the core, but it’s also often painful to shift focus from core businesses in which one has, understandably enough, an emotional as well as a financial investment.

No small part of the challenge is to accept that the previous status quo is no longer the baseline. Grocery retailer Aldi has disrupted numerous incumbents globally with its low-price model. Aldi’s future success was visible while Aldi was still nascent in the market. Yet many incumbent supermarkets chose to avoid the near-term pain of sharpening entry price points and improving their private-label brands. In hindsight, those moves would have been highly net-present-value positive with respect to avoided loss—as Aldi has continued its strong growth across three continents.

Stage three: The inevitable transformation

By now, the future is pounding on the door. The new model has proved superior to the old, at least for some critical mass of adopters, and the industry is in motion toward it. At this stage of disruption, to accelerate its own transformation, the incumbent’s challenge lies in aggressively shifting resources to the new self-competing ventures it nurtured in stage two. Think of it as treating new businesses like venture-capital investments that only pay off if they scale rapidly, while the old ones are subject to a private-equity-style workout.

Making this tough shift requires surmounting the inertia that can afflict companies even in the best of times.12 In fact, our experience suggests stage three is the hardest one for incumbents to navigate. As company performance starts to suffer, tightening up budgets, established companies naturally tend to cut back even further on peripheral activities while focusing on the core. The top decision makers, who usually come from the biggest business centers, resist having their still-profitable (though more sluggishly growing) domains starved of resources in favor of unproven upstarts. As a result, leadership often under invests in new initiatives, even as it imposes high performance hurdles on them. Legacy businesses continue to receive the lion’s share of resources instead. By this time, the very forces causing pressure in the core make the business even less willing and able to address those forces. The reflex to conserve resources kicks in just when you most need to aggressively reallocate and invest.

Boards play a significant role in this as well. Far too often, boards are unwilling (or unable) to change their view of baseline performance, further exacerbating the problem. Often a board’s (understandable) reaction to reduced performance is to push management even harder to achieve ambitious goals within the current model, ignoring the need for a more fundamental change. This only worsens problems in the future.

Further complicating matters, incumbents with initially strong positions can take false comfort at this stage, because the weaker players in the industry get hit hardest first. The narrative “it is not happening to us” is all too tempting to believe. The key is to monitor closely the underlying drivers, not just the hindsight of financial outcomes. As the tale goes, “I don’t have to outrun the bear . . . I just have to outrun you.” Except when it comes to disruption, that strategy merely buys time. If the bear keeps running, it will get to you, too.

The typical traditional newspaper operator, likewise, wasn’t blind to a shift taking place, but it rarely managed to mount a response that was sufficiently aggressive. One notable exception was former digital laggard Axel Springer. The German media company was “a mere Internet midget,” according to Financial Times Deutschland, until it leapt into action in 2005. It went on a shopping spree, acquiring 67 digital properties and launching 90 initiatives of its own by 2013.13 Like Schibsted, it saw the value pools moving to online classifieds and made the leap. The lesson is that incumbents can win even with a late start, provided that they throw themselves in wholly. Today, digital media contributes 70 percent of Axel Springer’s earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. The core has become the periphery.

To generate the acceleration needed at this stage of the game, incumbents must embark on a courageous and unremitting reallocation of resources from the old to the new model—and show a willingness to run new businesses differently (and often separately) from the old ones. Perhaps nothing underlines this point more than Axel Springer’s 2013 divestment of some of its strongest legacy print-media products, which accounted for about 15 percent of its sales, to Germany’s number-three print-media player, Funke Mediengruppe. These products, such as the Berliner Morgenpost, owned by Axel Springer since 1959, were previously a core part of the corporate DNA and emblems of its journalistic culture. But no more. They realized that the future value of the business was not just about the continuation of today’s earnings but rather relied on the creation of a new economic engine.

When incumbents lack the in-house capability to build new businesses, they must look to acquire them instead. Here the challenge is to time acquisitions somewhere between where the business model is proved but valuations have yet to become too high—all while making sure the incumbent is a “natural best owner” of the new businesses it acquires. Examples of this approach in the financial sector include BBVA’s acquisition of Simple and Capital One’s acquisition of the design firm Adaptive Path.

Stage four: Adapting to the new normal

In this late stage, the disruption has reached a point when companies have no choice but to accept reality: the industry has fundamentally changed. For incumbents, their cost base isn’t in line with the new (likely much shallower) profit pools, their earnings are caving in, and they find themselves poorly positioned to take a strong market position.

This is where print media is now. The classifieds’ “rivers of gold” have dried up, making survival the first priority, and sustainability and growth the second. In 2013, the CEO of Australia media company Fairfax Media told the International News Media Association World Congress, “We know that at some time in the future, we will be predominantly digital or digital-only in our metropolitan markets.”14 True, some legacy mastheads have created powerful online news properties with high traffic, but display advertising and paywalls alone are for the most part not enough to generate a thriving revenue line, and social aggregation sites are continuing to drive unbundling. Typical media firms have had to undertake the multiple painful waves of restructuring and consolidation that may be needed while they seed growth and look for ways to monetize their brands.

For the incumbents who, like Axel Springer and Schibsted, have made the leap, the adaptation phase brings new challenges. Having become majority digital businesses, they’re fully exposed to the volatility and pace that comes with the territory. That is, their adaptation response is less a one-time event than a process of continual self-disruption. Think of Facebook upending its business model to go “mobile first.”15 You can’t be satisfied with the first pivot—you have to be prepared to keep doing it.

In some cases, incumbents’ capabilities are so highly tied to the old business model that rebirth through restructuring is unlikely to work, and an exit is the best way to preserve value. Eastman Kodak Company, for example, may have been better off leaving the photography business much faster, because its numerous strategies all failed to save it. When a business is built on a legacy technology that is categorically different from the new standard, even perfect foresight of the demise of film or CDs would not have solved the core problem that the digital replacement is fundamentally less profitable.

The simple fact is that new profit pools may not be as deep as prior ones (as many newspaper publishers have come to believe). The challenge is to adapt and structurally realign cost bases to the new reality of profit pools, and accept that the “new normal” likely includes far fewer “rivers of gold.”



The reality is, most industries are still in stages one, two, and three. That’s why the early experiences of media, music, and travel companies can prove so valuable. These first industries to transition to a digital reality highlight the social and human challenges that by their nature apply to companies in most every industry and geography.

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Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Tech Savvy: How Blockchains Could Transform Management 05-25



What’s happening this week at the intersection of management and technology.

























Re-architecting the firm with blockchain: Is Craig Wright really Satoshi Nakamoto, the mysterious creator of Bitcoin? Who knows — and really, who cares? The bigger issue is blockchains, the distributed ledgers that underpin cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.
Blockchain technology has so many uses that trying to summarize them can make veteran tech experts sound like PR hacks. “As such, it holds the potential for unleashing countless new applications and as yet unrealized capabilities that have the potential to change everything,” write Don Tapscott and his co-author and son Alex Tapscott in their new book, Blockchain Revolution:


How the Technology Behind Bitcoin is Changing Money, Business, and the World.

That might sound like hyperbole, but it seems like everywhere you turn these days you run into blockchains. Banks are trying to harness blockchain before its blows up their business models. IBM is betting on blockchains to give its revenues a bump. Disney has a blockchain team doing … well, who knows what.


What we haven’t heard very much about is how blockchain could fundamentally change how companies are managed and operate. That’s a good reason to take a closer look at Blockchain Revolution, in which the Tapscotts devote a chapter to the topic. “Blockchain technology is enabling new forms of economic organization and new portfolios of value,” they write. “There are distributed models of the firm emerging — ownership, structure, operations, reward, and governance — that go far beyond enhancing innovation, employee motivation, and collective action.”


Intrigued? If you’d like read more about how blockchains might change the everyday operation of a business, check out the excerpt from the chapter, reprinted with permission, below.
The innovation hub — same as it ever was? The Internet has wrought significant changes in how we work, but some things — innovation hubs, for example — remain remarkably durable. “For hundreds of years,” writes freelance journalist Emily Sohn in Nature, “regions developed specialities that often arose from access to a natural resource, but then intensified as people moved to the regions to be among the expertise. The Internet was supposed to change all that. Around-the-clock connectivity that allowed researchers and entrepreneurs to collaborate from anywhere at any time meant that distance would no longer be an issue, predicted popular economic theory of the early 2000s. A decade later, it hasn’t panned out that way.”


Sohn reports that global connectivity seems to have stimulated the growth of innovation hubs, like Silicon Valley, rather than shrunk them. “Innovators and PhD students are now clumped together in fewer places, often in big cities,” she says. “And collaborations are more likely to happen between researchers who live, or have lived, close to each other.”


New and existing companies can’t afford to buck this finding. Locating in innovation hubs gives them greater access to talent. It also boosts their performance: Sohn cites studies that show start-ups located in hubs are more likely to survive, and firms in hubs are more likely to file patents than companies outside hubs.


It turns out that no matter how easy it is to collaborate at a distance, proximity remains an essential element in stimulating innovation. It sets the stage for serendipitous meetings. Face-to-face interaction also creates feel-good reactions in our brains that promote trust and more effective collaboration.


It’s not that digital connectivity inhibits innovation. Far from it, reports Sohn. Rather, it stimulates the enhanced innovation that is already taking place within innovation hubs — in effect, supercharging it. It’s a finding worth keeping in mind that next time your company is considering where to locate a new business unit or research facility.


Putting data to work with knowledge graphs: A brief story popped up in The Seattle Times last week: A data analytics company named Maana announced it had raised $26 million in Series B funding from the investment arms of Saudi Aramco and Shell. In these (waning) days of billion-dollar start-up valuations, $26 million isn’t especially jaw-dropping. But the company does have has an interesting approach to data analytics, which uses “enterprise knowledge graphs.”
There are a couple of problems with data in big companies. First, there’s lots of it, and it’s often stashed in separate silos. “A single division could have over 60 different information systems that they work with,” CTO Donald Thompson told tech reporter Rachel Lerman. Second, you need to turn the data into useful insights and recommendations. Third, you have get those into the hands of people who can use them to enhance results.


Bearing in mind that I’m a layman at best, here’s how Maana approach works: Instead of placing the company’s data into a common pool, it sends out a search engine to crawl the various data silos in your company. Then, instead of simply delivering a list of results, it uses analytics and machine learning to construct knowledge graphs — kind of like the ones that Google introduced a few years back — that provide actionable recommendations based on the goals and needs of the business and delivers them to line-of-business applications. Maana has used cases on its website that show how this approach works and the results it has produced in operational settings in industrial and oil and gas companies.





Reproduced from MIT Sloan Management Review