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Showing posts with label Disruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disruption. Show all posts

Friday, June 30, 2017

Business leaders may be overconfident in their ability to respond to disruption 06-30





Disruptive change is accelerating, driven by new technologies and rising competition from both traditional and nontraditional players. As a result, Innosight forecasts that half of companies in the S&P 500 will be replaced over the coming decade, due to loss of market value or acquisitions.

What are leaders doing about these challenges? And how do they feel about their ability to prepare for and manage them? In May 2017, we surveyed more than 300 executives at major corporations with revenues of $2 billion and higher about their current attitudes, experiences, and responses to marketplace disruption. The results tell a mixed story. Key findings include:

    • Business leaders may be overconfident in their ability to respond to disruption. 80% of respondents say they recognize they need to transform, and 82% expressed degrees of confidence that their company is prepared to change in response to disruptive trends. Yet there are multiple warning signs in the data—including perceptions of competition and disruption—that suggest they may be in a “confidence bubble.”
    • Broad understanding about what they need to do to respond to disruption. Executives see the need for a two-pronged approach to the future. They say they are likely to both transform their core business while also investing in new growth businesses. They also see the need to expand within existing markets and enter into new markets.
  • Talent and leadership are concerns. Executives say finding and retaining the right talent is considered the biggest obstacle to transformation. Moreover, 81% say that top management is not open to new ideas.
  • Digital and AI may be blind spots. Despite artificial intelligence and digital technologies rapidly transforming markets around the world, executives are downplaying the threat these forces will play to their own businesses. 


“One could say that the worrying thing here is that executives aren’t more worried,” says Scott Anthony, managing partner at Innosight. “The pace of change continues, and digitalization is accelerating, so leaders should be investing more, expecting to reconfigure their organizations and more, and should be paying closer attention to new product ideas and new growth ventures”

Main Finding: The Confidence Bubble

Perhaps the  most striking finding  is the  disconnect between confidence levels  and  specific per- ceptions of threats and  competition. 82% of respondents expressed degrees of confidence that their company is prepared to change in response to disruptive trends. Yet their actual activities fall short of what is required to justify  their confidence. There are multiple warning signs in the data that suggest they have strategy and  organizational blind spots that may undermine their ability to adapt.

• Underestimating new  sources of competition. When asked about the  sources of future competition, fully two-thirds of respondents (67%) think  it will be from “mostly existing” competition while fewer than one-in-four (23%) think  their companies will be facing “mostly new” sources of competition. In a related question, 55% expect competition to come mostly from  within their existing industries, with just 10% saying competition will come from new industries.                                                      
• New  thinking gets short shrift. 81% say new growth products and  ideas sometimes or often do not  get enough attention from  top management.                                                                                                              
• Keeping up, but not  ahead. When it comes to keeping up with the  pace of change, only
7% report their companies are  moving much faster than the  overall market, with only
24% saying somewhat faster.

Modest investment in digital. Digital business models and platforms are  disrupting industry after industry, but  53% of respondents said that they plan either no increase in digital investment or a less than 25% increase.                                                                                                                                              
• Underestimating new  technology. Despite rapid advances in the  emerging technology of artificial intelligence, fully 65% of executives said AI is not  too threatening or not  at all a threat to their business.

“One could say that the  worrying thing here is that executives aren’t more worried,” said Innosight managing partner Scott D. Anthony. “The pace of change continues, and  digitalization is accelerating, so leaders should be investing more, expecting to reconfigure their organizations more, and  should be paying closer attention to new product ideas and  new growth ventures.”


Reproduced from Innosight Research.

Saturday, November 22, 2014

The New Wave of Scalable Innovation: Dealing With Distortion in the Digital Era 11-22

The New Wave of Scalable Innovation: Dealing With Distortion in the Digital Era




The Digitized Economy is shifting value away from established players unable to evolve quickly enough. The speed and size of this shift is tremendous, fueled by yet another wave of new technology powerhouses — the young “unicorn” companies wielding billion-dollar valuations to shape entirely new markets, with a glut of private capital lubricating their engines. Such exponential super-startups are even taking the Internet giants by surprise. The disruptors are now facing their own disruption.
Today, startups don’t need to buy infrastructure when it’s available to rent ‘as a service’. They can focus on operations. This capacity enables change to happen much more quickly – and lets 60 employees at WhatsApp deploy services to half a billion people.
This is a shock for policymakers, incumbents, and regulators who hoped the last wave of tech-enabled transformations would settle into stability. Instead, we see fast-moving disruption multiplying itself, brought on by a new wave of scalable innovation.
The accelerating pace of change, the blur of commentary, and the glut of private capital further distort our view of the shifting landscape. For most, there’s too much noise and not enough information. This information asymmetry between the establishment, the Giants, and the new class of unicorns is driving the distortion factor.
The level of distortion is rising so quickly that many are unable to discern between cyclical bubbles and tectonic shifts. The trend away from public IPO’s makes it even harder to effectively evaluate innovations when the books are closed to most. It has become a contest of competing visions for the future, seen imperfectly by many, and brutally clearly by a few.
For regulators who struggle to react to large market transformations caused by fast-moving technologies before they become overly-disruptive, distortion is especially challenging. Many older businesses that have been regulated for decades now face a looming risk of job and revenue losses from new, unregulated competitors. The attacks on Google buses in San Francisco and the taxi protests against Uber across Europe are less about technology and more about uneven regulatory environments.
Tech unicorns often reduce the core business of older incumbents into commodities by reconfiguring their value into lightweight, scalable digital services. They then focus on emerging adjacencies that are not even seen by incumbents or regulators until it’s too late. Uber has leveraged mobile technologies to attack glaring inefficiencies in the cab and livery industries, shedding burdensome capex and grabbing a $17 billion valuation from private capital.
Cabbies and medallion owners struggle with the burdens of regulatory bodies unable to clearly see the threat. Their hard-won socio-economic protections are shredded by fast-moving innovations. By the time regulators understand the impact, Uber has already become big enough to leverage its base in support of its broader objectives.
So, how can stakeholders caught in this shift gain some clarity and conquer the distortion factor? With a sort of digital laissez-faire, fear-based distortion and emotional rhetoric must be overcome by pragmatic analysis and rational experimentation. We don’t yet know, for example, whether unicorns like Uber create jobs or commodify them. Regulators must make a proactive effort to understand shifts in technology and to allow time for these experiments to be fairly evaluated; otherwise we risk further constraining the culture of innovation.
Regulatory actors must also collaborate and iterate with the private sector to better understand the balance between disruption and economic benefit to the social commons. In many cases, problems have arisen simply due to lack of cooperation.
Business leaders must accept that the innovation that will matter most to your company is likely coming from outside. Many companies are now learning how to work with startups as collaborators rather than threats. To collaborate with potential disruptors while they’re young, corporate-sponsored startups and incubators in companies like Orange are mushrooming everywhere. Policymakers should join this conversation to help align strategic disruption with economic growth and prosperity. This is, after all, the value of good regulatory oversight.
No one knows where the next giants will emerge from. But we all know disruption will continue, so we should hop on the wave before it becomes a tsunami, and leverage the momentum towards opportunity, hope, and optimism.

Sunday, June 1, 2014

Business School, Disrupted 06-01



If any institution is equipped to handle questions of strategy, it is Harvard Business School, whose professors have coined so much of the strategic lexicon used in classrooms and boardrooms that it’s hard to discuss the topic without recourse to their concepts: Competitive advantage. Disruptive innovation. The value chain.

But when its dean, Nitin Nohria, faced the school’s biggest strategic decision since 1924 — the year it planned its campus and adopted the case-study method as its pedagogical cornerstone — he ran into an issue. Those professors, and those concepts, disagreed.

The question: Should Harvard Business School enter the business of online education, and, if so, how?

Universities across the country are wrestling with the same question — call it the educator’s quandary — of whether to plunge into the rapidly growing realm of online teaching, at the risk of devaluing the on-campus education for which students pay tens of thousands of dollars, or to stand pat at the risk of being left behind.

Harvard Business School faced a choice between different models of online instruction. Prof. Michael Porter favored the development of online courses that would reflect the school’s existing strategy. Credit
David De la Paz/European Press Photo Agency

At Harvard Business School, the pros and cons of the argument were personified by two of its most famous faculty members. For Michael Porter, widely considered the father of modern business strategy, the answer is yes — create online courses, but not in a way that undermines the school’s existing strategy. “A company must stay the course,” Professor Porter has written, “even in times of upheaval, while constantly improving and extending its distinctive positioning.”

For Clayton Christensen, whose 1997 book, “The Innovator’s Dilemma,” propelled him to academic stardom, the only way that market leaders like Harvard Business School survive “disruptive innovation” is by disrupting their existing businesses themselves. This is arguably what rival business schools like Stanford and the Wharton School have been doing by having professors stand in front of cameras and teach MOOCs, or massive open online courses, free of charge to anyone, anywhere in the world. For a modest investment by the school — about $20,000 to $30,000 a course — a professor can reach a million students, says Karl Ulrich, vice dean for innovation at Wharton, part of the University of Pennsylvania.

“Do it cheap and simple,” Professor Christensen says. “Get it out there.”

But Harvard Business School’s online education program is not cheap, simple, or open. It could be said that the school opted for the Porter theory. Called HBX, the program will make its debut on June 11 and has its own admissions office. Instead of attacking the school’s traditional M.B.A. and executive education programs — which produced revenue of $108 million and $146 million in 2013 — it aims to create an entirely new segment of business education: the pre-M.B.A. “Instead of having two big product lines, we may be on the verge of inventing a third,” said Prof. Jay W. Lorsch, who has taught at Harvard Business School since 1964.
Credit

Starting last month, HBX has been quietly admitting several hundred students, mostly undergraduate sophomores, juniors and seniors, into a program called Credential of Readiness, or CORe. The program includes three online courses — accounting, analytics and economics for managers — that are intended to give liberal arts students fluency in what it calls “the language of business.” Students have nine weeks to complete all three courses, and tuition is $1,500. Only those with a high level of class participation will be invited to take a three-hour final exam at a testing center.

“We don’t want tourists,” said Jana Kierstead, executive director of HBX, alluding to the high dropout rates among MOOCs. “Our goal is to be very credible to employers.” To that end, graduates will receive a paper credential with a grade: high honors, honors, pass.

“Harvard is going to make a lot of money,” Mr. Ulrich predicted. “They will sell a lot of seats at those courses. But those seats are very carefully designed to be off to the side. It’s designed to be not at all threatening to what they’re doing at the core of the business school.”

Exactly, warned Professor Christensen, who said he was not consulted about the project. “What they’re doing is, in my language, a sustaining innovation,” akin to Kodak introducing better film, circa 2005. “It’s not truly disruptive.”

‘Very Different Places’

Professor Christensen did something “truly disruptive” in 2011, when he found himself in a room with a panoramic view of Boston Harbor. About to begin his lecture, he noticed something about the students before him. They were beautiful, he later recalled. Really beautiful.

“Oh, we’re not students,” one of them explained. “We’re models.”

They were there to look as if they were learning: to appear slightly puzzled when Professor Christensen introduced a complex concept, to nod when he clarified it, or to look fascinated if he grew a tad boring. The cameras in the classroom — actually, a rented space downtown — would capture it all for the real audience: roughly 130,000 business students at the University of Phoenix, which hired Professor Christensen to deliver lectures online.

Why had his boss, Mr. Nohria, given him permission to moonlight? “Because we didn’t have an alternative of our own” online, Mr. Nohria explained.

The dean had taken a wait-and-see approach — until 18 months ago, when his own university announced the formation of edX, an open-courseware platform that would hitch the overall university firmly to the MOOC bandwagon.

He said he remembered listening to an edX presentation at an all-university meeting. “I must confess I was unsure what we’d be really hoping to gain from it,” he said. “My own early imagination was: ‘This is for people who do lectures. We don’t do lectures, so this is not for us.’ ” In the case method, concepts aren’t taught directly, but induced through student discussion of real-world business problems that professors guide with carefully chosen questions.

“Nitin and I are close friends, and we’ve talked about this repeatedly,” Professor Porter said. “I think the big risk in any new technology is to believe the technology is the strategy. Just because 200,000 people sign up doesn’t mean it’s a good idea.” Though Professor Porter published “Strategy and the Internet” in the Harvard Business Review in 2001, before the advent of MOOCs, the article makes his sternest warning about the perils of online recklessness: “A destructive, zero-sum form of competition has been set in motion that confuses the acquisition of customers with the building of profitability.”

Mr. Nohria ultimately chose for the business school to opt out of edX. But this decision forced a question: What should the school do instead? “People came out in very different places,” Mr. Nohria said. “Very different places.”

One morning, he sat down for one of his regular breakfasts with students. “Three of them had just been in Clay’s course,” which had included a case study on the future of Harvard Business School, Mr. Nohria said. “So I asked them, ‘What was the debate like, and how would you think about this?’ They, too, split very deeply.”

Some took Professor Christensen’s view that the school was a potential Blockbuster Video: a high-cost incumbent — students put the total cost of the two-year M.B.A. at around $100,0000 — that would be upended by cheaper technology if it didn’t act quickly to make its own model obsolete. At least one suggested putting the entire first-year curriculum online.

On the topic of online instruction, Prof. Clayton Christensen said: ‘Do it cheap and simple. Get it out there.”CreditRick Friedman for The New York Times
On the topic of online instruction, Prof. Clayton Christensen said: ‘Do it cheap and simple. Get it out there.” Credit Rick Friedman for The New York Times
Others weren’t so sure. “ ‘This disruption is going to happen,’ ” is how Mr. Nohria described their thinking, “ ‘but it’s going to happen to a very different segment of business education, not to us.’ ” The power of Harvard’s brand, networking opportunities and classroom experience would protect it from the fate of second- and third-tier schools, a view that even Professor Christensen endorses — up to a point.

“We’re at the very high end of the market, and disruption always hits the high end last,” said Professor Christensen, who recently predicted that half of the United States’ universities could face bankruptcy within 15 years.

Mr. Nohria states flatly, “I do not believe our M.B.A. program is at risk.” He concluded that disruption is not always “all or nothing,” and cited the businesses of music and retailing as examples. “In the music business, all record stores are gone,” he said, while in retailing, “it’s not like Amazon has eliminated everything; after those debates, my feeling was that we’re going to be more in that category.”

Still, Mr. Nohria said, he wanted some insurance. “Our beliefs can always turn out to be wrong,” he said. Harvard Business School could not afford to stand on the sidelines. So last summer, he said, he asked the business school’s administrative director, “What would you say if we started a little skunk works around this technology?”

‘Hollywood’ at Harvard

That skunk works, in a low-slung building 300 yards from campus, is not little. It buzzes with 35 full-time staff members — Wharton’s online efforts, by comparison, employ one-half of one staffer, Mr. Ulrich said — who are scrambling to complete a proprietary platform that, after this summer’s limited go-round, could support much larger enrollments.

“Here’s Hollywood,” Ms. Kierstead said on a recent tour, passing an array of video equipment that’s hauled around to film business case-study protagonists on location. Nearby, two digital animators worked on graphics for Professor Christensen’s forthcoming course. Another staff member handled financial aid.

To run HBX with Ms. Kierstead, Mr. Nohria tapped Bharat Anand, 48, a strategy professor who had been researching how traditional media companies have coped, or haven’t, with digital disruption. “I think about those cases a lot,” said Professor Anand, who is also Mr. Nohria’s brother-in-law.

The dean handed him a sheet of six guiding principles, including these: HBX should be economically self-sustaining. It should not substitute for the M.B.A. program. It should seek to replicate the Harvard Business School discussion-based style of learning. This was no easy assignment, Professor Anand conceded.

“What is competitive advantage?” he asked, invoking Professor Porter’s signature theory. “It comes from being fundamentally different. We teach this all the time. But saying it is one thing. Putting it into practice is hard. When everyone is going free, everyone is going with a similar type of platform, it takes courage to do your own thing.”

On campus, Harvard business students face one another in five horseshoe-shaped tiers with oversized name cards. They fight for “airtime” while the professor orchestrates discussion from a central “pit.”

“We don’t do lectures,” Mr. Nohria said. “Part of what had already convinced me that MOOCs are not for us is that for a hundred years our education has been social.”

The challenge was to invent a digital architecture that simulated the Harvard Business School classroom dynamic without looking like a classroom. In a demonstration of a course called economics for managers, the first thing the student sees is the name, background and location — represented by glowing dots on a map — of other students in the course.

A video clip begins. It’s Jim Holzman, chief executive of the ticket reseller Ace Ticket, estimating the supply of tickets for a New England Patriots playoff game: “Where I have a really hard time is trying to figure out what the demand is. We just don’t know how many people are on the sidelines saying, ‘Hey, I’m thinking about going.’ ”

It’s a complex situation meant to get students thinking about a key concept — “the distinction between willingness to pay and price,” Professor Anand said. “Just because something costs zero doesn’t mean people aren’t willing to pay something.” A second case study, on the pay model of The New York Times, drives the point home.

Then a box pops up on the screen with the words “Cold Call.” The student has 30 seconds to a few minutes to type a response to a question and is then prodded to assess comments made by other students. Eventually there is a multiple-choice quiz to gauge mastery of the concept. (This was surprisingly time-consuming to develop, Professor Anand said, because the business school does not give multiple-choice tests.)

At a faculty meeting in April, Professor Anand demonstrated the other two elements of HBX: continuing education for executives and a live forum. He unveiled the existence of a studio, built in collaboration with Boston’s public television station, that allows a professor to stand in a pit before a horseshoe of 60 digital “tiles,” or high-definition screens with the live images and voices of geographically dispersed participants. “I’m proud of our team, and how carefully they’ve thought about it even before they’ve done it,” Professor Porter said.

The Clashing Models

Not everyone was so impressed. Professor Christensen, for one, worried that Harvard was falling into the very trap he had laid out in “The Innovator’s Dilemma.” “I think that we’ve way overshot the needs of customers,” he said. “I worry that we’re a little too technologically ambitious.”


The dean, Nitin Nohria, found that students were also divided on the issue of online instruction.CreditRick Friedman for The New York Times
The dean, Nitin Nohria, found that students were also divided on the issue of online instruction. Credit Rick Friedman for The New York Times

He also feared that HBX was tied too closely to the business school.

“There have been a few companies that have survived disruption, but in every case they set up an independent business unit that let people learn how to play ball in the new game,” he said. IBM survived the transition from mainframe computers to minicomputers, and then from minicomputers to personal computers, by setting up autonomous teams in Minnesota and then in Florida. “We haven’t got the separation required.”

Professor Porter has expressed the opposite view. Companies that set up stand-alone Internet units, he wrote in 2001, “fail to integrate the Internet into their proven strategies and thus never harness their most important advantages.” Barnes & Noble’s decision to set up a separate online unit is one of his cautionary tales. “It deterred the online store from capitalizing on the many advantages provided by the network of physical stores,” he said, “thus playing into the hands of Amazon.”

Here is where the two professors’ differences come to a head. In the Porter model, all of a company’s activities should be mutually reinforcing. By integrating everything into one, cohesive fortification, “any competitor wishing to imitate a strategy must replicate a whole system,” Professor Porter wrote.

In the Christensen model, these very fortifications become a liability. In the steel industry, which was blindsided by new technology in smaller and cheaper minimills, heavily integrated companies couldn’t move quickly and ended up entombed inside their elaborately constructed defenses.

“If Clay and I differ, it’s that Clay sees disruption everywhere, in every business, whereas I see it as something that happens every once in a while,” Professor Porter said. “And what looks like disruption is in fact an incumbent firm not embracing innovation” at all.

In other words, it’s not that U.S. Steel was destined to be undone by minimills. It’s that its managers let it happen.

“The disrupter doesn’t always win,” argued Professor Porter, who nonetheless called Professor Christensen “phenomenal” and “one of the great management thinkers.”

Who will win the coming business school shakeout? Professor Porter acknowledged that it’s a multidimensional question.

Most schools offering MOOCs do so through outside distribution channels like Coursera, a for-profit company that has Duke, Wharton, Yale, the University of Michigan and several dozen other schools in its stable. EdX, of which Harvard was a co-founder with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, counts Dartmouth and Georgetown among its charter members.

“These will come to have considerable power,” predicted Jeffrey Pfeffer, a professor of organizational behavior at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. He pointed to the aircraft industry: “In order to get into China, Boeing transferred its technology to parts manufacturers there. Pretty soon there’s going to be Chinese firms building airplanes. Boeing created their own competition.” Business schools, he said, “are doing it again; we are creating our own demise.”

Professors as Online Stars

The worry is all the more acute at midtier schools, which fear that elite business schools will move to gobble up a larger share of a shrinking pie.

“Would you rather watch Kenneth Branagh do ‘Henry V,’ or see it at a community theater?” asked Mr. Ulrich at Wharton. “There are going to be some instructors who become more valuable in this new world because they master the new medium. We’d rather be those guys than the people left behind.”

This raises a still more radical case, in which the winners are not any institution, new or old, but a handful of star professors. One of Professor Porter’s generic observations — that the Internet increases the “bargaining power of suppliers” — suggests just that. “It’s potentially very divisive in a way,” he acknowledged. “We’re all partners; we all get paid roughly the same. Anything that starts to fracture the enterprise is a sobering prospect.”

François Ortalo-Magné, dean of the University of Wisconsin’s business school, says fissures have already appeared. Recently, a rival school offered one of his faculty members not just a job, but also shares in an online learning start-up created especially for him. “We’re talking about millions of dollars,” Mr. Ortalo-Magné said. “My best teachers are going to find platforms so they can teach to the world for free. The market is finding a way to unbundle us. My job is to hold this platform together.”

To that end, he has changed his school’s incentive structure, which, as in most of academia, was based primarily on the number of research articles published in elite journals. Now professors who can’t crack those journals but “have a gift for inspiring learning,” he said, in person or online, are being paid as top performers, too. “We are now rewarding people who have tenure to give up on research,” Mr. Ortalo-Magné said.

Mr. Ortalo-Magné spins out the possibilities of disruption even further. “How many calculus professors do we need in the world?” he asked. “Maybe it’s nine. My colleague says it’s four. One to teach in English, one in French, one in Chinese, and one in the farm system in case one dies.”

What is to stop a Coursera from poaching Harvard Business School faculty members directly? “Nothing,” Mr. Nohria said. “The decision people will have to make is whether being on the platform of Harvard Business School, or any great university, is more important than the opportunity to build a brand elsewhere.

“Does Clay Christensen become Clay Christensen just by himself? Or does Clay Christensen become Clay Christensen because he was at Harvard Business School? He’ll have to make that determination.”

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Monday, November 25, 2013

Disruptions: If It Looks Like a Bubble and Floats Like a Bubble 11-26

Disruptions: If It Looks Like a Bubble and Floats Like a Bubble …
By NICK BILTON




SAN FRANCISCO — It sounds like heresy around here. But here goes:
Is this another tech bubble?
Back East, the Wall Street money is starting to worry that it feels like 1999 all over again. Money-losing technology companies are going public at you’ve-got-to-be-joking prices. The founders of Snapchat are getting multibillion-dollar offers — and turning them down. And the Nasdaq composite index, a visible symbol of the ’90s dot-com boom and bust, is a sneeze away from 4,000, a level it last reached just before, well, you know.
Is this time different? Out in Silicon Valley, many insist it is. But for the average investor, there are reasons for caution.
Since the dark days of 2008, the Nasdaq has risen more than 150 percent, twice as much as the old-school Dow industrials. Money has been pouring into social media stocks. As of Friday, Twitter had risen nearly 60 percent since it went public only a few weeks earlier.
Once again, new “metrics” are being applied to justify stratospheric valuations. Twitter is losing money. A price-to-earnings ratio? There is no E in the P/E. But its stock is trading at 20-odd times the company’s annual sales. Good enough.
There is more. Technology companies have become the takeover bait du jour. A report   issued by Ernst & Young last week said that mergers and acquisitions in the global technology industry have rebounded to “a new post-dot-com bubble high.” Roughly $71 billion in deals were made during the third quarter.
And then there is Kozmo.com, the poster child of the dot-com bust. Kozmo is back. Last time, its couriers would deliver just about anything at any hour — CDs, Milky Way bars, you name it. It burned through $280 million before going bust.
“Remember us?” a banner on the Kozmo.com reads now. “We’re relaunching soon.”
Many technology entrepreneurs and venture capitalists say there is little to worry about. Which tells you something about bubbles and Silicon Valley. It is difficult to know when any bubble is going to pop until it does. And in Silicon Valley, with its inherent optimism in brighter tomorrows, the view tends to be that the way is always up.
“I’m not going to say there is a bubble or there isn’t a bubble,” said Naval Ravikant, co-founder of AngelList, a website for raising money for start-ups. “But I lived through the first bubble, and I was in disbelief the entire time, and I don’t see anything of that magnitude or scale here today.”
Such assurances aside, the numbers are sobering. Eight months ago, Snapchat was valued at $70 million. Today, it is valued at $4 billion,   even though it has zero revenue. Six months ago, Pinterest was valued at $2.5 billion. Today, it is valued at $3.8 billion — and no revenue there, either. And last week news broke that Dropbox was said to be seeking a new round of funding   that would value the company at $8 billion, up from $4 billion a year ago.
In Silicon Valley, pointing out this sort of thing is considered a bit impolite.
J. William Gurley, a general partner at Benchmark Capital, a big venture capital firm, has scoffed at people   who “write silly articles about the notion of a pre-revenue company having a very high valuation.”
When the media likened the precipitous decline   in the shares of Groupon to the events of the late ’90s, venture capitalists went on the offensive.
Michael Arrington, a partner at CrunchFund, wrote on Twitter that The Wall Street Journal was waging a vendetta against the company because it wrote a headline that read:“Groupon Investors Give Up.”   Chris Dixon, a partner at another venture capital firm, Andreessen Horowitz, joined in on Twitter.
“Everything is spun negatively,” Mr. Dixon wrote. “Comparing current valuations to the dot-com bubble is simply irresponsible.”
The venture firm Mr. Dixon joined last year was responsible for $40 million of the $950 million that early investors put into Groupon. But public stockholders have not done well. Groupon’s share price has been cut in half in the past two years.
Wall Street is starting to question how long this can all last. A recent Bloomberg survey   of Wall Street investors, analysts and traders who use the company’s financial data terminals found that the majority thought Internet and social media stocks were at or near unsustainable levels.
Roughly half said that the bubble was here or soon would be.
Not that the big investment houses are shouting sell. They rarely do. As of Friday, 12 of the 17 stock analyst recommendations for Twitter available on Bloomberg terminals were buy or hold. Only five were sell. Of the 48 recommendations for Facebook, 40 were buy and eight were hold. Not a sell to be found.
Michael Mandel, an economist at the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington who wrote presciently about the ’90s dot-com era, said that if there was a bubble this time — and there might be — its bursting would not be as bad as the last one. That is because back then, start-ups advertised on other start-ups’ websites and, in many respects, robbed Peter to pay Paul. So when one company collapsed, other dominoes fell, too.
“Bubbles that are not self-feeding are not a big problem, and I’m not seeing the kind of self-feeding that I saw in the ’90s,” Mr. Mandel said. “So if it turns out that the social media boom is overdone, or that any aspect of the tech economy is overdone, the only thing that will get lost is the money that was invested.”
Still, now that companies like Facebook and Twitter are traded on the stock market, the investing public at large is exposed. If big investment institutions pull back from the broad stock market or, worse, start dumping technology shares, everyday investors could get caught in the downdraft.
“What’s likely to happen is that there will be a huge winner-takes-all outcome, where one or two companies and investors will be successful,” said David Santschi, chief executive at TrimTabs Investment Research in Sausalito, Calif. “But as a result, there will be a lot of companies that are just going to go poof.”
And a lot of people’s money will go poof with them.




Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Captains in Disruption 06-12


Captains in Disruption

Even when facing a crisis, some CEOs know how to anticipate the worst, plan a response, and navigate to advantage. You can do the same.

Sooner or later, every corporation will face disruption. It may be the result of a decrease in its competitive advantage, a shift in the regulatory environment, or some catastrophic event that affects its ability to operate. No matter what the underlying cause, the chief executive is the person most accountable for managing the disruption. He or she must recognize its dynamics, anticipate its likely effect, develop a response, manage that response, and sustain the necessary changes. If the CEO is not directly involved in guiding his or her company through the storm, the entire company is likely to suffer—and, in extreme cases, disappear entirely.

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There is no single formula for managing a disruption, because it can come in any number of forms. Any event that has the potential to adversely affect a company’s business model or ongoing operations is disruptive. 

Some disruptions involve shifts in the dynamics of competitive advantage for an industry, stemming from a variety of causes—technological breakthroughs that favor new rivals, global changes in labor arbitrage, shifts in cost structure, or new rivals entering markets from adjacent sectors. Some are instigated by regulatory upheaval, such as the structural changes to the U.S. healthcare market set in motion by the Affordable Care Act. Virtually every CEO of a hospital system in the U.S. is confronting a major disruption to its business model as a result (see “Putting an I in Healthcare,” by Gil Irwin, Jack Topdjian, and Ashish Kaura, s+b,Summer 2013). There are also event-specific disruptions, such as economic downturns, idiosyncratic geopolitical and natural events, and unforeseen internal company events such as sudden major trading losses or public scandals.

The severity of these events can vary considerably, as can the duration. Some disruptions, like the rise of the Japanese auto industry in the 1970s that eventually crept up on U.S. and British carmakers, are so gradual that, like a frog in a pot of water, company leaders may never realize they are slowly boiling to death. Others are sudden and devastating, like the 2011 floods in Thailand that crippled the country’s hard-drive manufacturing sector and revealed extreme vulnerabilities in the industry’s supply chain.

Since the mid-1990s, disruptive events have become increasingly difficult to deal with. Technological evolution, ongoing globalization, two huge financial bubbles, the rapid pace of change in emerging economies, the deregulation and re-regulation of a number of industries, and waves of political turbulence in some regions have made the world a more challenging place to do business. For example, banks and financial institutions have had to rethink their business models after the financial crisis. And retailers and many parts of the media industry have seen their revenue streams fall away with the rise of new, technologically enabled competitors.

Yet even in the worst disruptions, some companies do better than others. These companies have leaders who recognize the crisis and act accordingly, either in advance or in time to recover. Some of the most celebrated cases are those of IBM, which shifted to business services before the rest of the computer industry did; BMW, which rebounded decisively from near-bankruptcy in the late 1950s; Ericsson, which reinvented itself in 2002–03 after nearly being driven out of business by sudden competition from Asia; and Lego, which rebuilt its supply chain and regained profitability after its retail channels dramatically changed.

In this article, based in part on our research on chief executive performance, we consider the steps that many CEOs are taking to become effective captains during disruption—captains who can not only manage through it, but turn it to their advantage. We have also directly observed CEOs managing disruption at a number of companies, and have drawn on interviews with two people who understand the issues in depth. Antony Jenkins took over as CEO of Barclays PLC to manage the bank through its response to the LIBOR rate-fixing scandal that struck in the summer of 2012. Clayton M. Christensen, the professor and management author who first charted the dynamics of disruption in The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (Harvard Business School Press, 1997), has explored a variety of disruption dimensions, including the personal impact in his new book, How Will You Measure Your Life?(with James Allworth and Karen Dillon; HarperBusiness, 2012).
To act effectively as captain of their company in a time of disruption, CEOs must lead in three ways. First is preparation: The CEO must make sure his or her company anticipates potential disruptions and puts in place the capabilities that will be needed when the time comes. Second is response: When a disruptive event occurs, leaders must develop the appropriate strategic and operational plans, which could include focusing on fewer products and services, engaging in large-scale business transformation, reorganizing the company’s structure, initiating mergers and acquisitions, launching a new wave of innovation, or making a change in leadership. Finally, there is implementation: CEOs need to set the response in motion and carry it out sustainably, ensuring that their company reaches the end goal.

Anticipate and Prepare


For every company in every industry, the first stage in managing disruptions is to learn to anticipate them and recognize their signs before they hit. You can’t predict every future challenge. But you can think about the kinds of disruptions that might be particularly devastating to your company, and prepare accordingly, shaping the degree of preparation to the nature and likelihood of the risk. Even environmental and natural disasters can be—and must be—prepared for. It’s particularly important for companies to pay attention to risks that they feel shielded from because of their own competence and capabilities. 

These can even include environmental and natural disasters. For example, though the earthquake that caused a tsunami to hit Japan in March 2011 was one of the strongest ever recorded anywhere, more than 75 deadly earthquakes have been recorded in Japan since 1900. Should Toyota have been able to anticipate and prepare for the effect an earthquake might have on its highly concentrated network of suppliers in northeast Japan? Perhaps the company’s confidence in its just-in-time manufacturing system blinded it to the vulnerability of its supply chain. Might your company be similarly vulnerable to the disruption of strengths that you have built up over time, and that you currently take for granted?

Anticipating disruption goes beyond the conventional practices of risk management. Virtually every company now employs a process to assess and address risk. These practices typically concentrate on day-to-day risks, those run in the ordinary course of business, including credit and foreign exchange risk, data security issues, and operational risks inherent in managing large-scale projects.

For truly disruptive events, many companies adopt a similar approach at a larger scale: They build analytic models assigning a probability and potential loss value to various kinds of risks, and then design preparations for each of them depending on their likelihood and potential for loss. Several recent events, however, have highlighted the limitations of this approach. 

Highly improbable events do occur, and failure to anticipate them—or even to imagine them—can be devastating. A further limitation lies in the relative strength of the risk models themselves. The financial firms that concluded in the mid-2000s that they had tamed the risks inherent in the subprime mortgage market soon discovered that their confidence was overstated.

The key to the problem, says Clayton Christensen, lies in the nature of data itself. “How can you make sense of the future,” he asks, “when you only have data about the past? That’s the role of theory, to look into the future.” In other words, you have to think through the reasons that the pattern of behavior in the data in this case appears to be different. Christensen adds that in most companies, top executives do not have access to candid insights from people at all levels—perspectives that they need if they are to plan for future disruptions. “Data is heavy. It wants to go down, not up, in an organization,” he says. “Information about problems thus sinks to the bottom, out of the eyesight and earshot of the senior managers.”

In Christensen’s view, chief executives (and other senior leaders) can compensate for these limitations only by learning to ask better questions. “Instead of looking at the data about today’s performance, I [need to] keep my attention on the questions I need to ask so I can catch the issues of the future…. For instance, if you’re concerned about disruption, you ask: ‘Which competitors are threatening me and which am I more likely to threaten?’ Disruption is a question about who’s going to kill whom.”
It falls to the CEO to ask questions this way, and to oversee the enterprise-wide thinking required to assess potential disruptions. Executives within business units and functional silos tend to focus on making progress toward their unit’s business objectives, and not to think deeply about longer-term threats to the whole company. Only the CEO can ensure that the company is taking a multifaceted approach to sensing and recognizing trouble. Chief executives must be willing to lead the effort directly, drawing on past methods of gauging risks and disruptions, while also admitting that the old ways of doing business are no longer adequate.

Plan and Respond


Once a potential disruption has been recognized as a real threat, it is time to develop a plan and initiate the first wave of reaction. The wake-up call will likely happen in one of two ways: Either the company’s leaders will realize that it is vulnerable to a potential disruption and thus needs to be shaken up proactively or an event-driven disruption will occur, and the leaders will see that the company must respond immediately.

Sometimes a CEO must plan a response to a sudden, unexpected disruption. When the LIBOR rate-rigging scandal broke in mid-2012, Antony Jenkins was the very successful head of the retail and business banking division of Barclays, then the U.K.’s second-largest bank. After both the bank’s chairman and its CEO resigned, Jenkins took on the role of CEO. He knew that the entire organization had to confront the scandal along with the pain that executives and staff felt about how Barclays was being portrayed in the press. At the same time, the financial-services industry as a whole was still navigating the collapse in trust that had followed the crisis of 2008–09—along with the reversal of globalization, heavier regulation, and a more adverse macroeconomic environment. This was a new and difficult situation for every bank.

Upon his appointment, Jenkins immediately made it clear to the bank’s 140,000 employees that short-term thinking and a focus on immediate profits—attitudes that had contributed to the LIBOR scandal and to aggressive tax practices in the structured capital markets division—would no longer be tolerated. (Barclays announced the closure of the structured capital markets division in February 2013.) He carried out a strategic review of the bank’s business units, which numbered more than 70. He then developed an overall strategy and new direction for the bank called TRANSFORM (Turnaround; Return Acceptable Numbers; and Sustain Forward Momentum).

“While there are many great things about Barclays,” Jenkins says, “the organization had had a cataclysmic experience. As a result, people were prepared to listen. The staff recognized that the environment had fundamentally changed and that we needed to respond. We could no longer focus exclusively on short-term profitability. We needed to think more broadly about the stakeholders we serve. The existential crisis helped me in this regard.”

Jenkins emphasizes the need to involve all stakeholders in asking the right questions and finding the right way forward. In managing the reaction to the LIBOR scandal, he spoke with politicians, the media, consumer groups, and regulators, in addition to bank employees. The day after the new strategy was made public, in February, he hosted a stakeholder breakfast. Some of the comments he heard were not easy to take, but it showed that he was willing to engage. “You have to meet stakeholders with humility, be prepared to listen, and then lay out a clear plan,” he notes. “And be willing to talk to those who do not necessarily agree with you.”

According to Jenkins, the precepts for leading a large company through a highly disruptive crisis are straightforward: Make sure you have a clearly defined objective and a compelling reason for it, develop a viable and credible plan for reaching that objective, and relentlessly and authentically pursue it. So far, so good: The day after the announcement of the new strategy, Barclays’ stock price rose 9 percent.

When planning a response to disruptive events, all chief executives should bear in mind several principles:

1. The CEO is the single most critical player in crafting and carrying out a response. The CEO must take immediate responsibility for the situation and be willing to hold him- or herself accountable for the ultimate success of the company’s response. For example, at Barclays, Jenkins knew he had to personally make clear his lack of tolerance for the kinds of activities that had led to the bank’s problems.
Whether the cause of the disruption is internal or external, foreseeable or entirely unpredictable, it is up to the CEO to set the pace of change. Sometimes it is necessary to short-circuit things; to force action, decisions, and transparency. After the first swift reaction, things may slow down a bit as decision makers deal with the long-term consequences of the disruption, but the company should still retain most of its momentum.

2. It is critical to begin breaking down human inertia. Complacency in the face of change comes naturally to any large organization. The chief executive must explain the situation and describe the new agenda in simple, clear terms. He or she must find simple but compelling messages to show that the old ways of being successful won’t work anymore. The changed nature of the game must be communicated to all stakeholders, both inside and outside the company, in a way that galvanizes this particular culture.

When Stephen Elop became CEO of the Nokia Corporation in 2010, he wrote a note, now famous within the company, in which he likened Nokia’s situation to standing on a blazing oil platform. The company faced not just a fairly new competitor with Apple’s iPhone, but a rapidly rising new product category, the smartphone, which Nokia had not found a way to counter. “We have to go faster, and harder, and more aggressively now than we’ve ever gone before,” he said. Employees, he added, have two choices: Either jump into the water, even if it’s 100 meters deep and freezing cold, or get burned. The note was controversial because some felt it pushed Nokia toward too much change, too quickly—but aggression was its point. It provided a clear statement that the company would be fearless in facing up to its dire competitive situation.

At the same time, a CEO should make clear that the company needs to be forward-looking, and declare a kind of amnesty for past activity. Decisions made and actions taken in previous years may have made sense at the time, but they must change as the situation changes. A new marketplace requires different ways of doing business, and it won’t work to simply carry on with legacy practices (and, in some cases, legacy products or services). If this requirement isn’t understood throughout the organization, executives can waste time defending their past behavior and actions.

When communicating the need for change, CEOs should describe the path ahead as clearly as possible, including the specific steps that will get the company through to the other side. For example, a few of the U.S. healthcare companies facing the disruptive changes of healthcare reform have developed a strategic communications process in which they explicitly lay out—for investors and employees alike—the decisions that must still be made in executing their strategy for managing disruption. On a regular basis, these executive leaders formally review the company’s choices and progress, ask their board to approve major changes, and reevaluate their components.

3. CEOs must make cogent decisions about the team of top executives.They must give people a chance to come on board with the new system and remove those who resist. If anyone visibly resists the changes, it soon becomes evident—to them and everyone else—that they are now at the wrong company. This process can be designed in ways that treat everyone, including those who exit, with respect. Nokia CEO Stephen Elop kept the senior leadership team largely intact, but set up an initiative, called the Challenger Mind-Set, in which executives were given a chance to show how well they could adapt. It was clear that those who could not perform would be better off elsewhere. Changes in top management must of course be made carefully, but even one or two visible changes can dramatically reinforce people’s awareness that the situation is serious.

4. It is often important to choose a small team of top decision makers to lead the response. Paradoxically, the more profound the changes planned, the faster they need to take place. A small team of top leaders can maneuver more nimbly than a large group.

Implement and Sustain


All too many companies, when faced with business crises, have initiated appropriate responses but have then been unable or unwilling to carry them to completion. When that happens, the issues that scuttled the response remain unaddressed, and the company will ultimately be even less prepared to face the next crisis. Ultimately, to implement a plan and sustain a company during disruption means looking closely at both the organizational design and the company’s culture. It’s up to the CEO to make sure that the structure and the culture are ready for the necessary changes and set up to support the new strategies and each other.
Organizational redesign. In most cases, response to disruption necessitates a shift to a more nimble, focused, and strategically aligned organizational structure—one that encourages other people to change, rather than trapping them in outmoded processes or approval gates. The new structure must enable people to cooperate fully across internal boundaries, even if that runs counter to long-standing patterns of communication or control.
One example of this type of redesign is Amedisys Inc., a provider of healthcare to patients in their homes. The Amedisys business model had long been built around payments from Medicare and other insurance companies. With pressure on Medicare prices squeezing profits considerably, Amedisys CEO Bill Borne, who founded the company and designed its original business model, decided that it would have to change. Amedisys should be paid for outcomes rather than offering a menu of narrowly defined services.
To pilot the new approach, Borne and the Amedisys top team created a “pirate ship”—an organizational unit kept separate from the mother ship, set up to prototype and offer a broader range of care for its clients. With any such skunkworks efforts, it is important to think through the separation in advance; how soon, and how thoroughly, can the insights and operations of the pirate ship be brought back to the main vessel?
Ultimately, the kind of organizational change typically needed to respond to disruption must be an ongoing effort. Says Barclays’ Jenkins, “It is about being continually dissatisfied with what you are doing. What is the next thing to drive for? There will always be a next phase. It is about constantly challenging and creating an organization that is never satisfied.”
Culture change. As difficult as organizational redesign may be, truly changing a large company’s culture in response to a disruption can be even tougher. But it is no less important. In the case of one large car company facing declining sales and a weak cash position, top executives had devised both a new strategy and a new operating model, but didn’t know what to do about their culture. They knew it had to be changed: It was slow and bureaucratic. The CEO set up a team of several of his best executives, who started defining the company’s cultural priorities: speed, willingness to take risks, and greater accountability.
The CEO understood that the only real way to change a company’s culture is by changing behavior. He began by asking his top team to make decisions in days and weeks, not months or years. They didn’t announce the change; rather, they just practiced the new behavior themselves, and it spread. Because the top 50 or so senior executives had become very isolated—the company had as many as 15 layers in its hierarchy—they began interacting informally with people lower down in the structure who actually knew what worked and what didn’t. The result was a much clearer picture of how the company operated, with the added benefit that the people involved became zealots about the need for change. The company made sure to act quickly on the best ideas generated through the process.
At Barclays, Antony Jenkins faced a tough task when he became CEO: to restore the bank’s public reputation and renew its internal culture. Though he had spent time at Citibank between 1989 and 2006, he began his career at Barclays in the early 1980s. Despite his time away, he considers himself an insider, which he feels has been a singular advantage since becoming CEO. In his view, it would have been incredibly difficult to come in from the outside and try to change Barclays. As an insider, he was already familiar with the strategic and cultural challenges facing the organization, and having the opportunity to “road-test” different approaches in individual business units was a significant benefit in taking on the CEO role.
“I was able to prototype what I believed in, first at Barclaycard and then at retail and business banking,” he says. “This became the foundation for my thinking about how to change the larger organization.”
Using his earlier experience, Jenkins developed a vision of a “go-to bank,” and turned it into action in the TRANSFORM program. The program was then approved by the board of directors, and presented publicly in February 2013. Now the challenge will be to sustain momentum and to run the bank to serve the interests of all its stakeholders.
Promoting cultural change, in Jenkins’s view, is feasible. “Leadership drives culture, and culture drives organizational performance,” he says. “Organizations look at how you behave, not what you say, and you can’t do it if you are not authentic and relentless. Do what you believe is right and do not get distracted by all the voices outside commenting on your plan.”
In this implementation phase of managing through a disruption, what CEOs do is at least as important as what they say. Too many leaders in crisis simply send memos from on high, rather than determine a course to do things differently. There is also a risk in trying to frighten people into changing their ways—the burning platform sometimes just scares them into freezing instead. Finally, CEOs confronting disruption need to reach out to people throughout the company who can help them cross-organizationally, and do so through informal interactions. Cross-organizational interaction is by far the biggest accelerator of change (see “Culture and the Chief Executive,” by Jon Katzenbach and DeAnne Aguirre, s+b, Summer 2013).

The Defining Moment

The Great Recession gave the CEO of virtually every company around the world a strong taste of the impact of a deeply disruptive crisis. Some chief executives thrived, making their company stronger than ever. Others simply muddled through. Still others watched as their company succumbed to the trauma.
The best CEOs understand that disruptions will happen, and that no company can insulate itself completely from their effects. But they also know that in any crisis there can be an opportunity. Companies that survive major disruptions are likely to come out even stronger, and better able to anticipate and prepare for the next one. As Clayton Christensen notes, it’s difficult to think this way, because leaders are always tempted toward complacency. “Almost all of them,” he says, “probably including me, tend to stop asking good questions—or else their successors do. For example, [former Intel CEO] Andy Grove really got the concept of disruption. His famous phrase, ‘Only the paranoid survive,’ was a statement about how to [anticipate and] respond to disruption.”
For any CEO who leads a company successfully through a disruption, that success will likely become his or her defining moment. If you are a chief executive, that’s the hidden opportunity disruptions provide. The next disruption to your company could be the event that most determines how you will be regarded and remembered as a leader.